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1.1 Introduction and Research Problem 
In January 2008, four Western tourists were kidnapped while on holiday in West 
Africa.1 The tourists were seized on their drive to Niger from Mali after attending a 
cultural event when shooting started. One vehicle escaped, but the other carrying a 
Swiss couple, a German woman, and a British man was disabled by gunfire. Next they 
were taken to a nearby country.2 Despite conflicting reports that the tourists were taken 
by a rebel group, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) initiated ransom 
negotiations.3 AQIM opened negotiations with the British government for Edwin Dyer in 
exchange for a high-ranking member of an armed group imprisoned in Britain. After the 
British government rejected this offer, AQIM made a second offer for €10 million for 
Dyer and one of the Swiss hostages.4 This offer too went unmet, and Mr. Dyer was 
executed. However, the Swiss couple and the German woman were freed for a reported 
€8 million.   
This tragic story is one of many like it that occurs regularly. Suddenly armed 
assailants rush unsuspecting aid workers or an improvised check point apprehends a 
 
1. “Organized Maritime Piracy and Related Kidnap for Ransom,” Financial Action Task Force 
Report, July 2011, 27. 
 
2. Ibid, 27.   
 
3. Ibid, 27. 
 
4. Matthew Weaver, “British Hostage Edwin Dyer ‘Killed by al-Qaida’,” The Guardian (London, 




businessperson or journalist unfamiliar with their surroundings. Conditions in captivity 
are Spartan, if not harsh, and life as a hostage may last months to years if ransom 
negotiations proceed slowly. If a family, government, or other private source will not or 
cannot pay a ransom the death of the hostage is almost certain.  
Arquilla and Ronfeldt of the RAND Corporation argue terror groups are presented 
with different challenges than other illicit groups.5 Asal and Rethemeyer found a strong 
terrorist organizational structure correlates positively with that group killing more 
people.6 Crenshaw’s work shows a distinction between collective rationality of terrorist 
organizations and the rationality of individual terrorists,7 and she argues that these two 
interests are not automatically in line with one another in spite of ideology.  
Armed groups must adapt to operate in unwelcoming hostile locations. Their 
illegal activates require them to operate stealthily to complete their operations without 
detection from authorities. However, this normally contradicts with their efforts to 
coordinate the tactics that they practice, e.g. bombing public buildings or shooting a 
police station, to perpetrate acts of violence. Jacob Shapiro calls the tradeoff between 
terrorist operational effectiveness and organizational security as the “terrorist dilemma.”8 
The more successful or numerous terror attacks an organization conducts, the more 
 
5. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and 
Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001).  
 
6. Victor Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer, “The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structure and the 
Lethality of Terrorist Attacks,” The Journal of Politics 70, no. 2, (2008): 437.  
 
7. Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic 
Choice,” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, State of Mind, ed. Walter Reich 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998): 8. 
  
8. Jacob N. Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations (Princeton, 





earnestly it must develop increasingly sophisticated standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) that are instrumental to masking the identity of an organization, in addition to 
other operational aspects. Here, armed groups have an upper hand because 
kidnappings are normally conducted in public areas. In fact, kidnappings are vastly 
underreported – so reliable statistics are difficult to come by, because many ransoms 
are negotiated only between perpetrators and victims’ families.9  
 
1.2 Research Question, Hypothesis, and Essential Definitions 
Does the tactic of kidnap for ransom affect the organizational behavior of armed 
groups? This is the primary question addressed by this thesis. The hypothesis this work 
posits is that: Kidnappings enlarges the infrastructure demands required to house 
victims, increases financial resources from ransom payments and often succeeds in 
wrestling concessions from local governments, particularly where authorities are 
ineffectual or anemic. Kidnap for ransom (KfR) is different from other ways terrorist 
organizations raise funds, e.g. robbing banks, trafficking narcotics, or legal business 
ventures because, unlike kidnapping, these other activities do not have a terror 
component. “Kidnapping is the confinement without legal authority of a person by one or 
others, against the will of the confined person. In so doing, the perpetrator or 
perpetrators often seek some political, financial or other advantage or benefit, such as 
the payment of a ransom or the release of imprisoned compatriots.”10 As such, 
 
9. Everard Philips, “The Business of Kidnap for Ransom,” in The Faces of Terrorism: 
Multidisciplinary Perspectives, ed. David Canter (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) 191.  
 




kidnapping can be considered a type of hostage taking,11 which the 1979 UN 
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages requires signatories to 
implement effective measures to prevent, prosecute, and punish as manifestations of 
international terrorism.12    
Of secondary importance is the broader issue of funding sources, specifically the 
narcotics trade. On its face these topics appear tangentially related to KfR. Yet, based 
on the research of the case studies the influence of the cocaine trade in Colombia and 
the opium trade in Afghanistan is undeniable. KfR is commonly practiced by both armed 
groups to varying degrees over the lifespan of each group as a tool to pursue their 
political goals as well as to increase revenue. In terms of the wider discussion around 
sources of funding for armed groups narco-trafficking is undoubtedly more significant to 
providing the means that allow for organizational expansion. While it appears that this 
topic derivates from the research question it picks up the where the analysis of KfR fails 
to provide sufficient evidence of organizational change for the FARC and the Taliban. 
With a bevy of financial assets, the FARC and the Taliban were able to attract new 
recruits, develop their material capabilities, and ideological cleavages that did not 
drastically alter their fundamental makeup. This discussion of funding sources will arise 
again in Chapter Four.   
 
 
11.  Article 1 of that convention states that “[a]ny person who seizes or detains or threatens to kill, 
to injure or to threaten to detain another person (hereafter referred to as the “hostage”) in order to compel 
a third party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or Juridical 
person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as explicit or implicit condition for the 
release of the hostage commits the offense of taking of hostages (“hostage-taking”) within the meaning of 
this Convention.“  
 





Some related questions that this thesis will answer to help us understand dark 
networks that commit acts of terror are: Does organizational behavior change as a 
group matures tactically? Boyns and Ballard (2004) were the first to recognize the 
importance of human capital to terrorist organizations because knowledge, training, and 
skill are required to build complex bombs logistically coordinate attacks on convoys.13 In 
their 2008 paper that explores the lethality of terrorism, Asal and Rethemeyer test six 
hypotheses related to the organizational aspects of terrorism in which they quantitatively 
test for human capital in dozens of terrorist organizations.14 To measure this variable 
they use quantity of members as a proximate for human capital, because the authors 
believe that as the number of members in a terrorist group increases so does the 
number of individuals who have advanced training useful for attacks. In this paper I will 
use their same logic of number of members in a terrorist organization in what I call 
organization maturity, i.e. the greater number of well-trained members a group acquires, 
the more mature it becomes. Why do groups choose to practice political kidnapping 
instead of kidnapping for ransom or vice versa? Of secondary importance I will also 
explore: If there is empirical evidence supporting an effective strategy to counter 
kidnapping such as a refusal to pay captives’ ransoms? Are there more recent 
developments in the practice of kidnappings from this century than in its “heyday” from 
the 1960s to 1990s? For instance, are kidnappings conducted by ISIS or the Taliban of 
journalists and civilians different from those of earlier decades?   
 
13. David Boyns and James David Ballard, “Developing a Sociological Theory for the Empirical 
Understanding of Terrorism,” American Sociologist 35, no. 2, (2004): 14.  
 




This research is important because it looks inside the black box of extremist 
groups to understand the particular aspects of how they operate, which will allow 
policymakers to tailor more precise response to acts of terror. Jacob N. Shapiro (2005a, 
2005b, 2006, 2010) in particular has conducted years of research focused on funding 
and inner operations of terror networks. Knowledge of a terror group’s organizational 
structure may lead to predicting how to counter violent acts and increase the likelihood 
fewer people will be abducted in the future. No less important than the organizational 
aspect is the financial one to the goal of combating global terrorism. in recent years 
policy makers have paid attention to minimizing KfR as a method to shrink the financial 
support for terrorist organizations, particularly as their nationals have been abducted 
abroad. In addition to more practical deductions one can gain from this research, 
learning more about organizational structures of “dark networks” is beneficial because 
they are among the key non-state institutions, together with NGOs and MNCs, that 
compete with states for influence in the globalized society of the 21st century.    
Readers familiar with literature on terrorism know that scores of definitions of 
terrorism exist. One widely accepted definition is Hoffman’s (2006) who notes five 
criteria: (1) political aims or motives by the perpetrator, (2) violence or threatening 
violence, (3) induces psychological repercussions of fear or terror beyond a particular 
attack, (4) conducted by an organization or individual, (5) perpetrated by a sub-national 
group or non-state entity.15 These conditions distinguish terrorism from other acts of 
violence or other groups involved in illegal activity. This last point excludes the 
possibility of state terrorism, which is problematic when discussing some violent acts by 
 





governments. Without a classification for acts of terror committed by states - such as 
the Saudi Air Force indiscriminately bomb Yemeni civilians in the Yemeni Civil War – we 
venture towards bias in favor of state action and possibly ignore the seriousness of that 
type of violence. For the purposes of this research such a disagreement can be set 
aside because the topic of state terrorism will not be addressed here.  
A defining characteristic of kidnapping is that the victim and perpetrators are 
concealed until a resolution, either positive or negative, occurs – normally outside of the 
public eye. Despite there being many forms of kidnapping, the two necessary elements 
of kidnapping are “human life and the hostage as carrier of symbolic capital.”16 The 
assumption that human life itself is valuable and that its value is undermined when it is 
traded for money or symbolic capital by kidnappers. “Symbolic capital” is what 
kidnappers aim to receive through committing the act. Although demands vary from 
monetary, social, e.g. equal rights for a disenfranchised ethnic group, or political, e.g. 
the release from prison of comrades the acquisition of these things increases the 
prestige of the perpetrators. Many forms of kidnap exist that range from bride 
kidnapping (wherein a man kidnaps a woman he wishes to marry an old custom that still 
occurs in some parts of the world to tiger kidnappings when someone is forcibly taken 
and obligated to commit a crime themselves.17 Bride kidnapping is in fact unique 
because its primary goal is not economic or political and could be described as an 
abduction because the targeted individual is intended to stay with her captor long-term.   
 
16. Rodanthi Tzanelli, “Capitalizing On Value: Towards a Sociological Understanding of 
Kidnapping,” Sociology (2006): 935.  
 





The types of kidnapping commonly recognized by business scholars, 
criminologists, and political scientists can be distinguished by either the economic or 
political motivations of the abductors, and these are the two categories pertinent to this 
study. Ransom monies acquired from KfR enable terrorist groups to pursue many 
activities including:  
“recruit and indoctrinate new members, acquire sophisticated weapons and 
communications gear such as satellite phones, establish training camps and support 
units, including “safe houses” and transportations operations, as well as provide 
financial resources which can be used to bribe government officials law enforcement 
personnel who can be of use to a terrorist organization in conducting its nefarious 
activities.”18  
 
Economic motivated kidnappings seek money in exchange for a person’s release 
whereas politically motivated kidnappings seek symbolic capital through political 
concessions, like the release of fellow combatants from an enemy prison.19 These are 
generalities and in reality nearly all cases of KfR are composed of a financial if not 
economic element—the difference being the scale of income gained but also the 
motivations of the hostage takers as well. Indeed, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) is estimated to have amassed at least $65 million between 2005 and 2011 from 
kidnappings alone.20 Between 2008 and 2009 the average price for a hostage’s ransom 
was $6.5 million.21  
Two important ideas to remember about kidnappings are (1) there is a financial 
factor present in all cases and (2) the sociopolitical status of the hostage is important 
 
 
18. See supra note 1, 26.  
 
19. Rachel Briggs, The Kidnapping Business (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2001), 61. 
  
20. See supra note 1, 26.  
 




with respect to the ransom payment.22 This has led some, including Turner, to assert 
that there is no meaningful distinction between political and economic kidnapping 
despite the motivations of the perpetrators, because the economic and political are 
always interacting – fogging rigid typologies.23 Although this position does cloud 
typologies of kidnappings as essentially for financial or political objectives, I think Turner 
is essentially correct in his assessment. Monetary or political motives for kidnapping are 
useful ways to study the phenomenon yet in the real-world things are rarely so clear and 
these classifications are not meant to be iron laws. When An additional way to help us 
clearly think about kidnap for ransom (KfR) is the definition utilized by the Global 
Terrorism Database which identifies terrorism as: (1) intentional acts, (2) practice of 
violence of the threat of violence, (3) propagated by a sub-national group, (4) directed at 
accomplishing a political, economic, religious, or social goal, (5) is aimed at targeting a 
larger audience, and finally (6) outside the context of legitimate warfare.24 This criteria of 
what constitutes terrorism is different from Hoffman’s definition above but it illustrates 
how a kidnapping can be an act of terror and not violent crime. Abducted persons taken 
for political reasons may have a symbolic status or be valuable in their own right, and 
their kidnapping is used to bring attention to an issue important to a group. Other times 




22. See supra note 15, 932. 
   
23. Mark Turner, “Kidnapping and Politics” International Journal of the Sociology of Law (1998): 
146. 
  
24. Global Terrorism Database, “Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables,” START University of 





The two main types of goals of the kidnappings that armed groups conduct are 
political and financial. Kidnappers will abduct those from a variety of backgrounds e.g., 
rich, poor, urban, rural, male, female, so long as a ransom can be paid, and there is no 
objective by the kidnapper besides monetary gain for the use of the organization.25  
Naturally, foreigners often make for high value targets due to their relative wealth 
compared to locals in less developed nations yet in some nations kidnapping of locals 
make up as high as 90 percent of all crimes annually.26 However, in Nigeria and South 
Africa between 1985 and 2000 kidnapped locals constituted only 20 to 40 percent of the 
total due the high level of poverty in those nations over this time, according to Briggs.27 
Some writers describe kidnap for ransom as a business, not simply because there is 
financial motive for this action but also because it requires complex organizational 
structures.28 Victims of political kidnappings are normally targeted individually and held 
for a multitude of objectives like vengeance, raising awareness to a group’s cause, or to 
create a climate of fear in a target population.  
The etymology of the word kidnap can be traced to 17th-century Britain, when 
children were taken in the night for ransom. Impressment of American sailors into 
service by the Royal Navy was a prime reason for the United States to declare war 
against Great Britain in 1812. Kidnappings in the 20th century gained worldwide 
prominence during the 1960s in Latin America, spread to Europe in the 1970s, then to 
 
25. See chapters three and five for discussions on target selection and the behavior of Kidnappers 
towards their victims. 
  
26. See supra note 20, 19. 
  
27. See supra note 20, 20. 
  
28. Phil Williams, “Transnational Criminal Networks,” in Networks and Netwars, eds. John Arquilla 





the Middle East in 1980s. More recently kidnappings reached epic levels in Chechnya 
and American occupied Iraq. This paper will not consider hostage situations, in which 
victims are seized but held in public, or hijackings, when many victims are held often on 
an aircraft or bus. 
 
1.3 Objectives, Methodology, and Materials  
In this work the author will use theories of organizational behavior to understand 
if and how kidnappings by armed groups affect the organizational structure of such 
groups. The author will explore several themes related to the tactic of kidnap for 
ransom, broader themes of financing, and use examples of groups that follow such 
patterns to support these claims. This work explores the ways armed groups change 
organizationally over a long period of time. Some groups among those studied have 
different objectives that highlight differences between political kidnappings and 
kidnappings for ransom which, it is thought, shape organizational structures.   
The author will answer the research questions mentioned above by means of the 
comparative method. The comparative method is typically imagined in one of two ways: 
either as the way to describe political or social systems or as means of informing about 
a process, the goal of which is to solve research puzzles that cannot be solved without 
comparing and logical reasoning.29 Comparative case studies range from the smallest 
single case study during a set time period when many variables can be studied to the 
largest study of all relevant cases over all time and space focusing on only a small 
number of variables, e.g. pooled time series analysis. A single case study is not 
 
29. Paul Pennings, Hans Kerman, and Jan Kleinnijenhuis, Doing Research in Political Science, 





explicitly comparative but may still implicitly be so, and it has the advantage of providing 
greater detail. Sometimes these are called “thick cases” and when a deviant example is 
considered it can help generate theories about what makes it an exception to the rule. 
At its broadest, a comparative study encompassing all possible germane cases has the 
obvious value of casting a wide net, yet it may have the shortfall of treating time as a 
constant variable.30 When choosing among approaches one must balance between a 
large number of cases with a few common variables versus control over a smaller 
number of cases that allow for a larger number of variables under consideration. A 
middle way between these extremes, which is used in this study, is to analyze two or 
more cases in a set time period normally before and/or after a specific event such as an 
economic crisis or political transformation. This approach has the benefit of a focused 
comparison derived from the research question. 
The logic of comparison is closely related to the issue of inquiry (what is studied) 
and unit of observation (what object is considered in studying a phenomenon) that is 
traced back to John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) who developed the ‘most similar’ and ‘most 
different’ tools of comparative research commonly used by students and scholars. What 
today we call MSSD (most similar system design) and MDSD (most different system 
design) aid researchers by easily allowing them to recognize what traits are similar and 
dissimilar respectively among cases in order to isolate pertinent factors for study and 
cancel-out the noise of differing case contexts. This work utilizes a MDSD across a 
diachronic time span with temporally diverse locations of Colombia and Afghanistan.  
 





Once one knows what to compare and why the next steps executed should 
create a design that helps the researcher answer their primary question. Asking oneself 
a series of questions will lead to the most direct and best possible way to solve a 
research question. Pennings, Kerman, and Kleinnijenhuis (2006) suggest four questions 
to lead scholars through what can be a confusing process to understanding how an 
effective study should look. First, what political concepts, e.g. actors, institutions, 
processes, are imbedded in the question? This question sets researchers on the road of 
theory seeking evidence to support it that results in a logical interpretation by 
researchers.31 Secondly, how well do the theoretical concepts “travel”, i.e. faithfully 
comparable from one system to another in a way that supports internal and external 
validity?32 33 Thirdly, what are possible cases that could shed light on the research 
question? Lastly, how does the researcher account for time, i.e. synchronic or 
diachronic, and space, i.e. where does this case take place, when selecting case(s) for 
observation? Finally, the researcher may decide to use many or few cases and then a 
MSSD or MDSD. In summary scholars must follow a series of steps in order to create 
the best possible organization design that answers his or her research question.  
To test these hypotheses, the author will compare two case studies. The strength 
of the case study is the detail it provides a complex social phenomenon in context that 
 
31. Ibid, 44.  
 
32. David Collier, “The Comparative Method” in Political Science: The State of the Discipline II, ed. 
A.W. Finifter (Washington, D.C.: APSA, 1993), 108. 
 
33. Todd Landman, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction, Second Edition 





illuminate the theoretical issues studied.34 A case study is a research strategy, not a 
methodology where context is deliberately included among variables that place 
emphasis on understanding processes. Due to the multitude of data available in a case, 
researchers need to construct a sound theoretical framework to cut through extraneous 
information that may lead a study off track. Without a focused theoretical framework, a 
case study may exhume interesting descriptive information without any wider 
significance. Theory-building by case study tends to be inductive, like the work of a 
detective who must piece together evidence to understand all relevant aspects of a 
crime and discard superfluous information.35          
The independent variable that will be attempted to isolate is kidnapping/drug 
trafficking and the dependent variable is organizational structure. Such cases selected 
here are of two well-known organizations. First, featuring the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC), a Marxist-Leninist oriented insurgency connected to the 
Colombian Communist Party (PCC) that fought the Colombian government for over 50 
years for greater income equality and broader rights over their land. Second, the Afghan 
Taliban (Taliban), not to be confused with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TPP) a separate 
but associated group of the Afghan Taliban, is a hard-line Islamist organization that 
practices an austere form of Sunni Islam alien to many Muslims, but which governed 
Afghanistan from 1996 when they nominally won the Afghan Civil War to 2001 at which 
point they were overthrown by a NATO coalition led by the United States. These groups 
 
34. Jean Hartley, “Case Study Research” in Essential Guide to Qualitative Methods in 
Organizational Research, eds. Catherine Cassell and Gillian Symon (Thousand Oakes, CA: Sage 
Publications, 2004), 323.  
 
35. Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods 2nd Edition, (Thousand Oakes, CA: 




have disparate ideologies, the FARC are Marxist-Leninist and the Taliban Islamic 
fundamentalist; additionally, they operate in radically differ diverse environments 
northern South American and South Asia but similar temporal spaces of the late 20th 
century through early 21st century. Among various other tactics of terrorism both groups 
are well known for their publicized kidnappings. With respect the kidnappings examined 
in this work both local and foreign hostages will be considered. Both sets are vital for 
telling a comprehensive narrative on the phenomenon although for the sake of the 
argument in Chapter Four those cases will focus on foreigners. These individuals do get 
a lot of the international media attention and their captivity is often more significant to 
international affairs. This being said, to ignore the kidnappings of locals, that in most 
locations and times compose the majority of cases would be to deny the context of the 
problem and pain an overly occidental picture that is inaccurate.    
Due to the well-publicized condition of both organizations primary sources are 
necessary for this research to make any claims beyond generalities.  
Conducting interviews with those who were kidnapped or members or former members 
of terrorist groups is unrealistic so primary sources will need to come from news articles, 
interviews, or memoirs/autobiographies. Secondary sources are also employed to 
explore organizational behavior theory and the histories of the two groups. I will 
examine data by searching for changes in patters of kidnapping practice and 
organizational practice with attention to specific events that could show causality of an 







The plan for the remainder of this work is as follows: A comprehensive literature 
review in Chapter Two will explore topics relevant to group behavior, structures, and the 
theoretical roles groups play for healthy human behavior. Armed group organization 
patterns can skew hierarchical to the point of leadership by a dictatorial leader or as 
decentralized as a lone wolf who may or gain inspiration through the Internet from 
organizations with which he or she is unassociated. It will conclude by exploring 
boundaries of research on kidnap for ransom and what is lacking in this discourse.   
 Chapter Three will seek to understand why terrorist organizations decide to kidnap 
for ransom. It could be that kidnapping with political motivations will achieve different 
goals. There is some disagreement amongst writers on how to categorize different 
forms of kidnapping and where meaningful differences exist. Some questions that this 
chapter will ask are: What factors might influence a group to practice this tact rather 
than car bombings or target assassinations? Are there environmental or time factors 
that prompt groups to implement this use of force? This chapter focuses the reader’s 
attention to kidnapping by telescoping from a broad view of armed group target 
selection through the lens of ideology to a narrower focus terrorist target selection 
based on strategy finally arriving at what makes kidnap for ransom appealing as a tactic 
of terrorism.  
By observing two case studies Chapter Four will address the main research question 
posed above: Does the tactic of kidnap for ransom affect the organizational behavior of 
armed groups? At first glance, it would seem the answer would be negative - but we 




observed were not what was hypothesized and the causal mechanism of KfR did not 
have the explanatory power that was anticipated. Generally, the greatest changes 
observed in both groups that took place in the FARC and the Taliban were in their ability 
to continue their struggle against the enemy; the ideological change of its members, or 
what might be called drift. Some less significant developments resulted in either 
organization too.  
Finally, Chapter Five concludes this study by inquiring about the prevalence of 
kidnap for ransom of foreigners, which makes international headlines and whether it is 
an act of terror that should concern societies. In response to this small but not 
insignificant threat, should states encourage or discourage ransom payments to 
abductors to free abductees? These two areas represent the current lines of inquiry into 
research on kidnapping; therefore, it is fitting to end this study here. A concluding 
section will summarize the most important findings uncovered in this work and suggest 
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This chapter will develop the theoretical basis for the organizational framework of 
armed groups from their topmost level of leadership to the bottommost cellular level. It 
will begin with an examination of the importance of groups to human society and well-
being. Later, the discussion will move to the intricate and murky world of financing of 
terrorism. The application for this exploration is utilized in Chapter Five, which focuses 
on implication of paying kidnappers’ ransom and how states have reacted against their 
countrymen’s kidnappings. Finally, the last section of this chapter will explore the 
practical matter of the procedure of a kidnapping and the modius operand of 
perpetrators.    
2.1 The Fundamental Elements of Groups  
Shapiro identifies three dimensions of organizational design within covert 
networks for the purpose of comparing networks with one another. The three 
dimensions he identifies are: interconnectedness, hierarchy, and specialization.36 
Degree centrality – “or the average number of connections to an individual in a network” 
– is one method to measure interconnectedness. For example:  
 
…consider two networks, Network A is a network of four cells of size six 
and one or two outside connections per cell. Network B is a cellular network with 
six cells of size four and two outside connections per cell. By most reckoning, 
network B would seem more interconnected, yet the mean degree centrality of 
the Network A is higher, 5.3 for Network A vs. 3.5 for Network B. 
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We can determine by the outcome of Network A as more connected that this 
measurement favors dense connectedness within cells.  
A group is three or more people working together to achieve a task, so group 
dynamics refer to the set of relationships of those in any group. They are the building 
blocks of many terror groups, businesses, political parties, or other successful 
cooperative ventures. Groups exist to fulfill six human needs: (1) inclusion with a 
community, (2) a need to give and receive love, (3) to exert power over others, (4) a 
need to communicate and alleviate stressful situations, (5) for enjoyment and to have 
fun, and (6) a need to communicate to lower anxiety.37 An aggregate, or several people 
in the same location and time not devoted to a task is not a group. For example, there is 
a difference between volunteers working on a political campaign and an audience 
watching two candidates debate in an auditorium. Another important difference between 
a group and an aggregate of people is that groups are interdependent. Interdependence 
arises when the members of a group are working together on a common task.  
Several features contribute to a group’s successful accomplishment of its goals. 
Without observing basic norms, a group cannot effectively operate, but following norms 
is not sufficient for success. Norms are established standard expectations of attitude 
that direct behavior of a majority of members that must be observed.38 Group 
commitment of a member to his or her comrades and to the values and mission are vital 
 
37. Scott A. Myers and Carolyn M. Anderson, The Fundamentals of Small Group Communication 
(Thousand Oakes, CA: Sage, 2008), 10. 
 





for cohesion and are composed of three types: emotional, intellectual, and moral.39 A 
certain amount of trust is essential with any relationship. In terms of group dynamics 
without trust new members cannot be accepted into a group and little work could be 
done because members would act alone. Once trust is established support can grow so 
that members of a group may rely on one another for positive psychological 
reinforcement during times of emotional stress or material scarcity.   
Social identity theory (SIT) analyzes interactions between in-groups and out-
groups postulating that individuals enhance their views of themselves by comparisons 
with an out-group, which has value and emotional significance to group membership. 
Self-classification with a group increases the value one ascribes to themselves, and 
increases the defensiveness one feels when their group is attacked.40 When a valued 
social group is perceived to be attacked, e.g. an attack on a national or religious activity, 
then those who share that group identity tend to hold negative views of the outside 
aggressor group. Once a member has internalized the group identity an assault against 
the wider group is perceived as an assault on the particular member.41 This theory is 
based on the assumption that in-groups view out-groups as inferior to them or in 
competition with them. 
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Formalization as identified by organization theorists is “the extent to which rules, 
procedures, instructions and communications are written, and the degree to which rules 
are explicitly defined.”42 A high level of formalization prescribes the behavior of group 
members, clear communications, quality control of operations, well-defined roles and 
tasks, and develops SOPs to diminish uncertainty.43 Behavior of members, can be 
regulated three ways. (1) Positional formalization of behavior relating to a job 
description can stipulate qualifications one must possess to in order to qualify for a 
position. (2) Work flow behavioral formalization reminds individuals of specific tasks 
they are required to complete. (3) Rules based behavioral formalization, for instance 
this might be a code of conduct individuals must follow to stay in good standing as 
member to their organization. Strong formalization moderates what might otherwise be 
unpredictable relationships when group members unfamiliar with each other meet; this 
in turn fosters institutional memory. Longer institutional memory helps groups avoid 
mistakes made in the past; it aids groups’ effectiveness by allowing them to recognize 
patterns over time through multiple interactions with outsiders or within their 
organization. The terrorist’s dilemma hinders formalization as standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) become more predictable and regular counterterrorism (CT) officers 
can more easily detect the patterns of groups via their communications and repeated 
behavioral patterns.44  
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The structure of any terrorist group is molded by that group’s necessity to secure 
itself from CT authorities of the state and its desire to effectively implement its attacks, 
which are often competing objectives. Most of the previous research conducted on 
terrorist organizational structure covers single case studies despite large open-source 
datasets such as the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).45      
 
2.2 Organizational Structure and Leadership Style in Terrorist Organizations 
An organizational structure is another variable in the equation of a successful 
terror attack. It is an intangible structure of people consisting of lines of authority and 
communication that attract and train new recruits, raise revenue, conduct operations, 
and compete with rivals. Successful organizations learn and adapt to new challenges 
and no matter their field or industry act as a force multiplier whereas poor organizations 
are chaotic, prone to making mistakes, and are at a greater likelihood of being taken 
over by rivals. The standard way of viewing groups that commit terror is through a 
hieratical or horizontal structure but other typologies persist. Jackson distinguishes 
among networks, groups, and movements while Kilberg separates among all-channel, 
market, hub-spoke, or bureaucracy types of groups that commit acts of terror.  
With respect to hierarchy, organization charts can hide the true nature of an 
organization’s hierarchy. Given that in reality we can say a group is hierarchical if those 
who provide a political and ideological vision also exercise operational direction.46 The 
aspects that leadership controls are twofold. Firstly, the specific operational elements 
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that includes targeting, planning, and execution of a covert act. Secondly, the logistics, 
procurement of materiel, and financial and accounting features require supporting 
covert acts, so the two types of control are operational control and resourceful control. 
Shapiro identifies four features of operational control or resource control he claims 
classify an organization’s hierarchy:  
• An organization is centralized when the center directly controls 
operations and resources. 
• An organization is de facto centralized when either (1) the center 
controls resources, delegates operations, but has a credible 
anility to monitor operations and withhold resources if operations 
are not carried out to its liking; or (2) the center controls 
operations, delegates resource procurement, but has a credible 
ability to engage in violence against factions. 
• An organization is de facto decentralized when either: (1) the 
center controls resources, delegates operations, but does not 
have a credible ability to monitor operations; or (2) the center 
controls operations, delegates resource procurement, but does 
not have a credible ability to engage in violence against factions. 
In tis case, control is exercised only at the whim of the factions.  
• An organization is decentralized when the center provides only 
ideological guidance and cells self-fund or coordinate among 
themselves regarding operations and resources.  
 
    
Hierarchical structures consist of a large base of support culminating with a small 
pinnacle of leaders subdivided by increasingly small strata of order. Fraser and Fulton 
say terror organizations have four levels. At the top the smallest level of commanders 
draft strategy and provide vision and guidance, but it is difficult for them to communicate 
with their subordinates so they little direct daily supervision over the group’s activities.47 
Just below the commanders is the active cadre who actually perpetrate acts of terror 
and who are normally skilled in one area attack, e.g. bomb making or computer hacking 
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and have their own subordinates that support their work. Active supporters, who 
Matusitz claims are the most important strata of the hieratical structure because 
successful attacks cannon occur without the logistical support, safe houses, or money 
raised by them, work directly under cadre members. On bottom is the largest group 
called passive supporters who are difficult to identify because they do not always openly 
support terror groups, yet they are nevertheless essential for a climate of political 
success that accepts the ideas and worldview of terror groups.  
In the past two decades terrorist networks have taken on an increasingly 
decentralized and horizontal shape. Most terror groups number fifty or fewer members, 
so they lack the expertise and manpower to pull off sophisticated attacks beyond soft 
targets with minimal security. Hamas is an example of a horizontal group in which 
members are selected to participate in an attack based on that individual’s expertise to 
complete a task. It is also common for cells in horizontal networks to operate openly in 
mosques and other social gatherings while other cells operate more covertly – a 
phenomenon known as special differentiation.48  
Decentralization has costs and benefits associated with that variety of 
organizational design. Indeed, a decentralized organization has an advantage over the 
hierarchical or centralized organization with respect to evading CT authorities due to 
their more numerous links between cells than a top-down structure.49 On the other 
hand, decentralized groups face principal-agent problems when, for example, cell 
leaders ignore the orders of the center, or when leaders at the highest levels do not 
have the same understanding as leaders on the ground regarding the situation at the 
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grass-roots level. The disconnect between a terrorist organization and the population 
they claim to support can and does have negative effects in their campaigns at times 
“confusing tactical success for strategic achievements”. Fewer connections between 
cells restricts the capability for problem solving of unexpected tribulations by low-level 
commanders that force extra mental demands upon senior commanders.50            
Leadership style may be classified in two categories of authoritarian or 
charismatic. Authoritarian leaders exert strong control over the organization they direct 
through strong-arm tactics and a tight organizational structure with closed decision 
making. Outside of the small cadre of leadership lower strata of members have little say 
regarding the goals or strategies of their group; moreover, this may lead to close 
mindedness and groupthink by a leadership that can lead to rash thinking and mistakes 
made. Powerful authoritarian leaders commonly use punishment and fear to enforce 
their decisions, which discourages factionalism. Active supporters under authoritarian 
leadership regularly receive military style training to promote discipline among the ranks 
and to develop recruits’ basic fighting skills. Well-known examples of groups under 
authoritarian leadership are the PIRA and the Red Army Faction (RAF). 
Some scholars have compared terror groups with charismatic leaders to cults 
that rely upon the personality of a single inspiring leader who is normally a gifted 
communicator or a brilliant strategist. According to Durkheim,51 a cult is a group of 
people organized around shared ideas and solidified by traditions and rituals – indeed a 
broad definition. It is possible for the charismatic leader to attract numerous followers 
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but his or her greatest strength is also the terror group’s greatest weakness. When such 
a leader is no longer in charge due to death, capture, or a change in his or her beliefs 
such a group may fall apart because of the centrality of the one who is no longer 
present. Charismatic leaders possess many of the same traits of: intelligence, ability to 
harness emotion to effectively communicate an inspiring message, decisiveness, 
adaptability, and levelheadedness under stress. Two examples of terror groups that are 
characterized as having charismatic leaders are the PKK once led by Abdullah Öcalan 
and al-Qaeda partly founded by Osama bin Laden. 
In addition to the qualities of a charismatic leader he or she performs roles that 
distinguish them from an authoritarian leader that when harnessed are powerful tools for 
motivation. Heads of personality cults appear larger than life to their followers who may 
inspire worship for members; consequently, the teachings of such as person are taken 
unequivocally as truth. A leader as a positive role model improves the self-image and 
legitimacy of a terror group’s cause for which it struggles. Storytelling can add a 
mystique to the past exploits of a group that can help them become folk heroes, or it 
can create an inspiring vision of the future once the group’s goals are attained. These 
features of the charismatic leader assist to draw in passive and active supporters 
adding to the rank that in turn legitimizes that group. 
In order for a terrorist group to implement KfR on a large scale over an extended 
period of time, a well-organized structure must exist. If, for instance, a terrorist 
organization is diversifying into KfR when they already have experience in human 
trafficking or smuggling, it will be easier to modify preexisting procedures, tactics, and 




similarities between human trafficking, smuggling, and kidnap for ransom. All three 
activities require differentiated cells to execute the specialized activities required for a 
successful completion of an operation. For instance, these activities necessitate guards, 
drivers, money handlers, surveillance teams, and storage facilities or safe houses, 
however the emphasis on each role may differ based on whether a group is smuggling, 
kidnapping, or human trafficking.52 Still, the physicality of taking, holding, and hiding 
people is similar in all three cases, so there is not a great deal of difference between the 
misdeeds practically.  
Small groups do not have the expertise of their larger counterparts that can train 
their members for specified duties. A small group will likely have better success with 
KfR in a politically and socially insecure environment where authorities are not trusted 
by the populace either because the authorities are ineffective or corrupt. For instance, 
following the collapse of the Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, and the dismantling of 
the Iraqi armed forces, that allowed the country to descend into a chaos where 
widespread KfR was possible. At that time, small, unorganized criminal gangs took 
advantage of an unstable environment to exploit unprotected citizens for easy monetary 
gain. Sometimes, hostages would then be sold to insurgent groups too.53 This is how 
common street gangs can work with insurgents and armed groups in a convoluted 
nexus of crime and terrorism for political and financial advantage.             
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2.3 The Significance of Cells to “New Terrorism” Organizations    
Cells are the building blocks of many modern day organizations, which were 
introduced by the IRA after Michael Collins studied terrorist tactics of the 18th and 19th 
centuries.54 There is no set configuration of cell organization or hierarchy, yet they 
consist of a small subset of an organization designated for a particular mission and are 
cordoned off from other cells in their vicinity.55 This decentralized organizational 
characteristic represents one feature of ‘new terrorism’. That is, a horizontal body of 
networks sometimes without a central leadership as opposed to a top-down hierarchy.56 
Overall, the Taliban displays more features new terrorism features than the FARC that 
should be considered an ‘old’ terrorist group. Isolation of cells is a strength of their 
design because if one cell is eliminated it cannot offer any information regarding the 
activities of its neighbors to CT authorities. It is not uncommon for cells to have a 
detached connection to its leadership, which practically means that the details of its 
planned mission are at the discretion of cell members. More autonomous cells are 
sometimes called sleeper cells especially when they are located in a foreign state. A 
notable feature of the cell is its clandestine nature that protects it against recognition by 
enemy organizations and is designed to impart fear into the target population who is 
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unaware when or if an attack will happen.57 Three obstacles exist in identifying 
clandestine cells: (1) missing information about intent, target, and timing; (2) identifying 
who is and is not a member of the cell; (3) keeping track of the moves of the cell that 
are constantly morphing. 
Clandestine activities foster stronger bonds of trust and support as an “us versus 
them” attitude, which develops in addition to the defensive position secrecy offers. 
Members of the cell frequently recruit from among their personal connection to preserve 
the bonds of loyalty established in the cell. This severely limits the number of potential 
newcomers who will likely join yet this aversion to open enlistment of those not in 
members’ social circle guards from the potential detection and elimination of the cell.58 
Sleeper cells, those that lay dormant but become active at a predetermined time or by 
its own determination, may or may not be clandestine once active in the target 
community.  
Self-starter cells are a newer innovation to the terrorist group family that unlike 
other cell forms has little or no connection to the original organization. Individuals who 
belong to this type of terror cell are often called amateurs and when a group that 
commits an act of terror, like al-Qaeda for example, has many self-starter cells it is said 
to be franchising. A cause for the proliferation of franchises is the ease of 
communication available through the Internet both through the worldwide continuous 
coverage of terror groups via the news and the ability of extremists to spread their 
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message through social media, online propaganda, and digital publications that glorify 
violence and extremist ideologies. 
 Since the invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent dismantling of centralized 
al-Qaeda self-starter cells have been a foremost concern to policymakers in North 
America and Western Europe. Evidently these fears have not been unwarranted due to 
the number of high-profile attacks since the early 2000s including Madrid 2004, London 
2005, and many others around the globe. Decentralization of terror networks has the 
potential for greater danger than more traditional forms of small groups of extremists 
because they do not need to travel in order to receiving training, do not need to 
communicate with known individuals who are identified as dangerous to state 
governments, they receive less suspicion because they are commonly citizens of the 
target state, they can easily target soft targets, e.g. cinemas, schools. 
Terrorism, as in crime, is not always a group activity. Individuals who commit acts 
of terror alone are called lone wolves because they work alone and are not directed by 
central leadership. Despite their perceived individuality lone wolves are normally 
inspired by the goals of a group or its ideology. Lone wolves idealistically or naïvely 
believe their violent actions will further a righteous cause against a wicked or ignorant 
society despite overwhelming odds against them. Hoffman59 makes a distinction 
between lone wolf terrorism and individuals who are sometimes called lunatic 
assassins. Those two categories of attackers may use similar tactics and target the 
same people (students at a university or a celebrity); although, they have different 
purposes       
 





 Successfully orchestrating a terrorist campaign requires coordinating many 
specialized tasks including: fundraising, intelligence gathering, weapons knowledge, 
recruiting new members, public and media relations, and security. For this reason, basic 
levels of interconnectedness and hierarchy must be present and a group operating in 
the proper environment fertile to terror campaigns. Specialization refers to the range of 
tasks a cell is expected to complete.60 A number of constraints exist on specialization; 
for example, in the decentralized organization if interconnectedness is sufficiently high 
and multiple secure communication lines occur where group members can plan attacks 
with reasonable certainty their conversations will not be detected. Greater hierarchical 
organizations with lower levels of interconnectedness can nevertheless specialize if 
group leaders efficiently allocate resources without arousing detection from security 
authorities. Low-level specialization is possible in any organizational form, but may also 
lead to corruption within the group limiting the goals of its aims.61 When 
interconnectedness is limited among specialized groups, communication is retarded and 
ultimately the ability to exchange ideas and learn from past mistakes made by other 
cells. The difficulty with studying specialization is that in the literature a distinction is not 
normally     
Organizations must be concerned with the space and time in which they operate 
in addition to their structural design or leadership. Working in conjunction with 
environmental factors can make a crucial difference between success and failure for 
any group. For terrorist organizations this means coming to grips with normally 
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operating in a hostile environment. Yet, sometimes it can mean taking advantage of a 
space with limited government presence or that is governed poorly where they can raise 
funds, plan operations, or train recruits in relative safety.62 Face-to-face interactions 
generate higher levels of trust among members and commanders can more easily 
control their subordinates. However, the greater the amount of space and longer the 
time a terror group operates the more it exposes itself to CT measures by governments. 
Complex operations that require many months of planning and frequent communication 
between members pose a hindrance to the relative security of an organization and 
place greater stress on operational space and time. This inherently increases the 
probability of detection or leaks. Knowing these things makes the 9/11 hijacking all the 
more impressive, because training and planning for that operation took over a year, and 
meetings were conducted around the world.  
 
2.4 The Financing of Terrorism 
 Financing of terrorism is a murky and convoluted subject that combines funding 
sources, funding methods, and funding channels which often traverse states and 
include legal and illegal activities. Money is the blood that runs through the body of the 
terrorist organization delivering nutrients to all extremities and inner organs. Ramzi 
Yusef, the man convicted for attacking the World Trade Center in 1993, admitted had he 
had the suitable funds he could have built the bomb he intended to bring down the twin 
towers.63 Since the recognition of transnational terrorism, especially after 9/11, terrorism 
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financing has become a significant source of interest for policy makers and researchers. 
According to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism, funds for terrorism are: “assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, 
moveable or immovable, however acquired, or legal documents or instruments in any 
form, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, 
including, but not limited to, bank credits, travelers checks, money orders, shares, 
securities, bonds, drafts, letters of credit.”64 This is obviously a vast category of financial 
instruments. 
 As mentioned above, a feature of New Terrorism is its generally flatter 
organizational structure. With respect to financing of their operations cells are expected 
to raise a greater share of their own funds. Probably no where do we see a stronger 
element of new terrorism in the FARC and Taliban case studies than in the realm of 
fundraising. In both cases, although to a different degree, observers can see a generally 
decentralized approach to fundraising. For the FARC financial decisions are often but 
not exclusively made at the front, or mid-level, of the group. While the Taliban’s district 
commanders, mid low-level leaders, normally take a lead in raising and spending 
monies. The greatest development in fundraising from older groups to newer ones is 
loss of state funding as a primary source of income.65 Groups from the IRA to Hamas 
and Hezbollah raised a great deal of their income from Iran, Libya, and Syria; although, 
they still participated in criminal activity like armed robbery, KfR, and drug smuggling.66 
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In particular the Gaddafi regime in Libya suffered for its support of terrorist causes 
during the 1980s when two Libyan fighters were shot down by American F-14s and in 
another instance when Tripoli was bombed in 1986.67      
The relative importance of kidnap for ransom varies across terrorist 
organizations, yet it is a consideration when examining terrorist financing. Not only does 
this tactic vary across organization, but also by the developmental stage of a group, the 
economic environment where they operate, operating costs required for a to function.68 
Potential financial and political rewards of a kidnapping must be balanced against the 
costs of running the group’s wider operation. Acquiring weapons comes with a danger 
and a price as well as the caring for hostages and paying kidnappers and guards. By 
way of reducing costs, hostages may be kept in farmhouses, abandoned buildings, 
cellars with others captured at different intervals. This was a common observation of 
former FARC hostages. In this respect, comparing two similar terrorist organizations 
can offer some insight into the differences between groups that do and do not heavily 
kidnap.  
EU and US government officials estimate, for instance, that al Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) likely has a much lower operating costs than other groups 
with higher social welfare costs, such as Hamas or Hezbollah; it instead focuses 
primarily on operations.69 Efforts to track and prevent funds to AQAP are difficult 
 
66. Jeffrey M. Johnson and Carl Jensen, “The Financing of Terrorism,” The Journal of the 
Institute of Justice and International Studies 10 (2010): 104.  
  
67. Ibid, 104. 
  
68. “Organized Maritime Policy and Related Kidnap for Ransom,” FATF Report, (2011): 30. 
   





because monies transmitted frequently and in small amounts transmitted through 
discrete hawalas. AQAP does not engage high levels of KfR due to adverse risk factors. 
Conversely, EU and US officials agree that KfR is one of AQIM’s primary sources of 
income, which is estimated at €15 million annually.70 Increased kidnappings over the 
past decade in the African Sahel have provided AQIM with the financial resources to 
conduct numerous more operations in North Africa. American officials estimate the 
average ransom price per hostage is $1 million that is paid for recruitment, 
administrative costs, and operations.71  
A unique feature of Islamic terror financing are charities funded through zakat 
often translated as almsgiving in English. Zakat as one of the five pillars of the faith is a 
fundamental demonstration of righteousness and an ancient method for promoting 
economic equality between rich and poor.72 American court records indicate Yassin al-
Qadi, a Saudi businessman who the American government consider a financier of 
charity projects and terrorism, moved CHF1.46 million from a Swiss bank account to the 
Quranic Literacy Institute of Chicago, which distributes Islamic textbooks.73 According to 
the FBI the Quranic Institute purchased property in Woodbridge, Illinois outside of 
Chicago in a manner that attempted to hide the source of the money as coming from al-
Qadi International. Furthermore, the U.S. Justice Department claims this property 
investment by the Quranic Institute was intended to generate income for a Mohammed 
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Salah, a confessed Hamas operative who was arrested over January 1993 in Israel.74 
This case was part of a larger investigation into Mr. al-Qadi’s financial contributions. 
 Sources of income for financing of terror operations are derived from a variety of 
sources of both legitimate and illegitimate means and fronts of businesses and NGOs. 
For instance, the gem and precious metals industry can be a shadowy domain for 
moving valuable, small, and unmarked commodities across borders. Al-Qaeda heavily 
invested in the West African diamond market after its assets were frozen by the 
American government in 1998 following the bombing the bombings in Tanzania and 
Kenya of US embassies. Established diamond buyers in Sierra Leone and Liberia had 
difficulty purchasing products for their costumers because new buyers were paying 
between 15 to 30 percent higher for the stones than the market price.75       
Funds are raised by other curious means like cigarette smuggling, automobile 
resale, credit card fraud, and counterfeiting of consumer products. Two brothers of 
Lebanese background were convicted in the United States for reselling cigarettes 
across state lines then using the proceeds to purchase military equipment including 
night-vision goggles, rife scopes, metal detectors, laser range finders, and others to 
Hezbollah associates in Lebanon.76 An official with Interpol testified before the United 
States Senate Foreign Relations Committee that al-Qaeda and Hezbollah have begun 
counterfeiting “Nike shoes, Calvin Klein jeans, and Sony small electronic equipment’, an 
innovation in fundraising for terrorism. The commercial cost from breaking intellectual 
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property rights was estimated at between $200 and $250 billion annually according to 
this same senior official.77 Three Pakistani men and one Saudi man were detained in 
Frankfurt Airport by customs officials because they were linked to a scheme whereby 
German luxury cars were bought then sold at a considerable markup in Saudi Arabia, 
according to the Bundeskriminalamt BKA or German federal police. Furthermore, they 
were one of 12 believed money-laundering rings in Germany supporting militant training 
camps in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Palestine.78                
The hawala is another is another noteworthy financial conduit not only for its 
distinctiveness but also for its ubiquity within some Muslim communities. It is the 
transfer of money from one agent to another without the use of commercial financial 
institutions like banks or money exchange, so in this way it is informal. Hawala literally 
translates to remittance in English. They are estimated to move $2 trillion annually 
which accounts for only 2 percent of all money moved around the globe.79 However, 
more specific data on hawala is largely conjecture.80 What is special about hawalas is 
that for consumers they are simple to use, cheaper for moving money than Western 
financial institutions, and provide a great deal of anonymity for the consumer because 
transactions leave no paper trail. Efforts to regulate these informal wire services have 
received some critique from the IMF and other free-market advocates as raising the 
cost of business thereby hurting small users. 
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   Cash couriers are an old profession which have taken on greater importance in 
the past several decades as moving money through the international financial system 
has become more closely monitored by governments. The same can also be said for 
the use of message couriers for a similar reason that electronic communications that 
are not encrypted are easily captured by CT authorities with or without the cooperation 
of telecom firms. According to a study by the Council on Foreign Relations, the physical 
movement of money by couriers is “abetted by weak border controls and a cash-based 
culture very unlike the Western credit-and-electronic based economy.81 To illustrate, in 
April 2001 a policeman noticed Mohammed Suleiman Vaid attempting to cross the 
South Africa-Swaziland border walking awkwardly. Upon searching Mr. Vaid, the officer 
discovered five pounds of South African Rand concealed in the man’s underwear. In a 
specially made bodysuit under her niqab Mr. Vaid’s wife had the equivalent of $90,000 
in Rand.82 It was later uncovered that the man had crossed from South Africa to 
Mozambique 150 in the previous 18 months.     
 As qualitative and quantitative date on the functioning of terrorist organizations 
are difficult to acquire, tracing the spending practices of any group is likewise 
challenging. Fortunately, it is possible to gain a generalized understanding of the 
budgets of some groups from public statements and captured financial documents. The 
Afghan Taliban have publicized specifically how ransom money they receive is used in 
operations against coalition troops. In an interview conducted by The Telegraph 
newspaper with Taliban representatives Mullah Hezbollah said,  
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“It was a God-sent opportunity. It has helped us to multiply our stockpile of weapons 
and explosives to wage battle for at least a year or so.” Mullah Hezbollah continued, 
“We were really concerned when we received orders to launch Operation Nursat, 
because we had hardly any funds to buy weapons to carry out such a major offence. 
Thanks to the ransom payments, however, the operation proceeded with full vigor.”83  
 
Some especially detailed reports come from captured records from al Qaeda in Iraq that 
were analyzed by the Rand Corp. Although, this data is specific to AQI, now ISIS, it is 




2.5 Opportunity in Civil Conflict 
 This study relies heavily on the contributions of those who have developed 
theories and conducted research in the literature of greed in civil conflicts and civil 
conflict economies. People are not regularly considered natural resources as are timber 
or gemstones yet kidnapping for ransom is not so different than exploiting these other 
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resources. In both cases people and inanimate (non-animal) natural resources are 
typically exploited in illegal markets, during civil conflicts, both must be processed or 
stored somehow, and then sold in a market or ransomed in the case of people. The 
greed hypothesis is the dominant approach in conceptualizing civil conflict outbreaks, 
continuation, and lethality. Brenner (2016) criticizes this theory and others that treat 
rebel groups as unitary actors as ideas with little empirical evidence to support. As far 
back as the 1970s Scott similarly criticized multifaceted social movements as being 
simply labeled “communist” or “nationalist”.   
 Ross’ (2004) work examines how civil wars begin, their duration, and intensity by 
testing 13 hypotheses to identify the causal mechanisms that link these topics to natural 
resources. He found eight cases of the 13 tested that were statistically significant and 
positive. Most notably they were: 1) resource wealth in an area is more likely to lead to 
the outbreak of civil war, a finding that Collier and Hoeffler (2002) also agree. 2) Many 
commodities e.g., oil, minerals, and non-food cash crops, are casually linked to 
occurrences of civil war, which is similar to the results of Fearon and Laitin (2002), and 
de Soysa (2003) that oil-exporting states are more likely to experience civil war. 3) Drug 
trafficking did not lead to civil war in Ross’ data, but that it did lengthen the duration of 
civil war. 5) The prevalence of ‘lootable’ natural resources does not always correlate to 
higher levels of conflict e.g., AGs may cooperate to mine diamonds. 6) Resource wealth 
and civil wars are linked by a variety of mechanisms that at the time of his paper’s 
publishing were not well understood. Large N quantitative studies can only take 
researchers so far in identifying such mechanism and more case studies are required to 




 Fearon (2004) seeks to uncover why some civil wars last longer than others. 
More specifically his research asks what conditions contribute to a swift victory for one 
side or a stalemate? What Fearon discovered is that coups and popular movements like 
that of Iran in 1979 conclude quickly. Anti-colonial wars since 1945 and tend to not last 
long. Conversely, civil conflicts between a smaller ethnicity that is back by another state 
against a dominant ethnicity last longer. As well, civil wars last longer when rebel 
groups are able to sell traffic narcotics or profit from extortion.  
 LeBillon 2001 seeks to discover the theoretical relationships among natural 
resources, armed conflicts, and the historical processes by which they are embedded. 
He does this by analyzing the materiality, geography, and other socio-economic 
processes of armed conflicts and how it relates to natural resources. The author finds 
that natural resources and conflicts are related in a couple different manners: 1) 
conflicts are motivated by control of resources and 2) those resources are used to 
finance conflicts yet case 2 is more common. Exploitation of natural resources does 
influence the agendas and structures of AGs but this is not as significant as the 
underlying political grievances that motivate civil conflict. Concerning vulnerability of 
society to violence, the greater level of ‘lootability’ of a resource and the economic 
dependence on that resource then the greater likelihood a society is to succumb to civil 
conflict. Naturally, not all states commonly considered to have a high level of reliance on 
primary have histories of civil strife but geography and political economy lend 
themselves to exacerbating conflicts.  
 Collier and Hoeffler (2004) also investigate the causes of civil war using a 




onset of internal wars familiar to this subset of literature. Rebellions may arise from 
unusually strong grievances like inequality, few political rights, or ethnic, religious, and 
societal divisions. However, rebellion may come from atypical opportunities for 
belligerents to make financial gain. To test their hypotheses, the authors developed an 
econometric model to identify instances of civil war. This article updates Collier and 
Hoeffler (1998) which concluded that rebels must make-up losses incurred during 
conflict after hostilities end in order to justify initiating a conflict. What they discovered 
since that work is that rebels quickly cover their military costs and then some during a 
civil war. In light of this realization the authors developed a model that prioritized 
opportunities for violence better predicts conflict than one that prioritized political 
grievances. An important factor for influencing opportunity for rebellion is the availability 
to finance spending on rebel’s materiel and labor costs especially via the sale of primary 
commodities. Such incentives for profit make the decision to rebel easier. Similarly, 
young men, and women in some cases, have few opportunity costs to forgo joining a 
rebel AG when there are few educational institutions in their area or means to earn 
good wages. Finally, there is greater probability for rebellion in sparsely populated 
geographic areas. The authors three primary findings are consistent with the economics 
literature on causes for civil war.                    
 
2.6 Kidnapping as a Tactic of Armed Groups 
There does not exist a great deal of research dedicated to studying kidnappings; 
however, this is changing within the past fifteen years. Case studies documented this 




Aldo Moro and the Red Brigades. Pires, Guerette, and Shariati conducted a study using 
multiple sociopolitical independent variables, which empirically challenge common 
claims that kidnappings occur in failed and weak states. It claims to be the first study of 
its kind and the results affirm predictable outcomes that the highest rates of KfR occur in 
states with challenged “socioeconomic, sociopolitical, and security” circumstances.85 
There is neither great amount of theoretical writing on the related topics of hostage 
taking or hijackings of planes, buses, or boats – all tactics that involve preventing the 
movement of humans unless in return for financial or political compensation. However, 
of note is Tzanelli’s article that critiques the two debates of KfR as a purely political or 
financial motive and she puts forth the notion that kidnapping is a natural effect of 
capitalism. This work separates itself from other studies on the topic due to its 
theoretical approach. Most of the work conducted in this topic comes from  
In fact, the terrorist tactic that has received the most significant volume of special 
attention in the wider terrorism literature in the past two decades is suicide attacks. This 
could be due to the prominence of armed groups in that time, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, 
Islamic State or it could be due to the unique nature of someone giving their life for a 
cause. In Martin’s words, suicide attacks have an indelible appeal because they:  
possess an intelligence and flexibility other weapons do not have; inflict significant 
psychological damage on an enemy; are relatively “cheap” weapons, so long as the 
reservoir or volunteers is maintained; and exact a high human toll from an enemy while 
at the same time incurring acceptable losses.86 
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Nevertheless, it is somewhat unusual that not more tactics have received so much 
attention as suicide terrorism considering, for example, the innovation of cyber 
terrorism. It has the potential to create tremendous harm when used to attack vital 
infrastructure like power plants, water filtration plants, or hospitals and banks. Finally, 
though, to put the incidence of KfR into perspective below is the following pie chart 
depicting “Hostage Taking” as a small proportion of all terrorist attacks for one year.87 
Within the hostage taking category is the even smaller subset of kidnap for ransom. 
 
The existing literature on kidnapping runs in two primary tracks of works 
exploring the fundamental questions of who, what, when, where, and why. Who is being 
kidnapped? What groups are kidnapping? When (which year) are kidnappings 
occurring? Why are kidnappings happening (for either financial or political reasons)? 
 
 




While the other primary, and newer, strain of work on KfR explores the efficacy and 
ethics of paying ransoms to kidnappers for the purpose of safely freeing hostages. Both 
sets of work emphasize quantitative methods of small N and large N samples and data 
sets that span decades. Studies dedicated to various questions on ransom payments 
also often use historical illustrations and case studies to enhance their argument.  
With respect to establishing basic facts about KfR, Forrest’s study stands out 
from the others in regards to how well it describes the groups involved in kidnapping, 
the countries where it occurs the most, the nationalities of hostages using 40 years of 
data with the conclusion that kidnapping has increased over that period.88 Yu also 
presents an interesting analysis from which he develops five typologies of kidnapping 
hotspots that he uses to determine different motivations of kidnappers and to determine 
how best to resolve those abductions.89 Type 1 are hotspots where KfR is a by-product 
of recent war. Type 2 is where kidnapping is chronic and even morphed into a business. 
Type 3 hotspots occur where there is internal social strife and conflict typically between 
two ethnic or religious groups. Type 4 is the country of Nepal where “terrorists” mostly 
use kidnapping to make political propaganda messages and where there is also a low 
casualty rate of hostages. Type 5 is Nigeria where foreign employees of MNCs, 
especially oil companies, are targets of local kidnappers. Ransom payments from these 
cases are commonly used to then invest in small infrastructure projects in local 
communities. In this manner Type 5 is unique. Then, Briggs work based on her study of 
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geographic KfR hotspots develops the idea as kidnappers as business owners that take 
into account risk versus reward which is to a great deal determined by the environment 
in they operate. That is, for example, states with weaker governments face lower risk in 
their kidnapping business, which is of course more advantageous to kidnappers. Her 
work then goes on the describe current (in the year 2000) policies designed to combat 
KfR; in this way Briggs work is a bridge to the other main body of kidnapping literature.  
Easily the most significant contribution to the discussion on making ransom 
payments is journalist Joel Simon’s book published in 2019 We Want to Negotiate: The 
Secret World of Kidnapping, Hostages, and Ransom because he addresses both sides 
of the argument for and against paying ransoms using nearly 50 years of data and 
reviews the current academic and policy evidence to support his claim that to not pay 
ransoms is counterproductive.90 Also, of note is Jenkins 2017 Rand publication “Does 
the U.S. No-Concessions Policy Deter Kidnapping of Americans?” because he traces 
the evolution of the American no-concessions policy since the Nixon administration 
highlighting its inconsistencies and raising hypotheses about why such a policy fails to 
meet policy makers’ desired goals in his opinion.91 What is also noticeable is that 
Jenkins references Rand’s previous work in the 1970s on the subject of public policy 
towards the American ransom policy and how those past findings still ring true.  
Similar to Jenkins paper is one authored by Loertscher and Milton of the United 
States Military Academy Combating Terrorism Center Held Hostage: Analyses of 
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Kidnapping Across Time and Among Jihadist Organization.92 These authors examine 
kidnappings by Jihadist groups since the year 2000 and conclude that kidnappers act 
opportunistically with respect to whom they take yet an abductee’s nationality does play 
a role in how likely they are to be released. So, Loertscher and Milton decided that 
public policy is a factor in whether a hostage is released but they do not cite which 
policies effect such outcomes. The outlier study written by Brandt, George, and Sandler, 
which uses a fancy Bayesian Poison change-point model, in their in quantitative 
analysis of three cohorts of states that differ in their willingness to negotiate with 
kidnappers comes to nearly opposite results of the above authors.93 Brandt, George, 
and Sandler argued that as “terrorists” were more successful in getting concessions, 
either financial or political, they are more likely to continue to kidnap in the future. In 
light of these findings they suggest states adopt a no-concessions policy so as not to 
motivate more kidnappings of their nationals. 
Current literature on kidnapping does well at identifying the geographic areas in 
which the phenomenon happens most frequently and those authors who develop these 
descriptions do estimate the numbers of hostages across area and time, such as this is 
possible to acquire accurate statistics. The literature as it stands also identifies the most 
prominent groups that kidnap including vital information such as their origins, 
development, ideology, and goals. Vital to presenting this data are the cataloguing work 
of the Global Terrorism Database at the University of Maryland and the Center for 
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Analytics at the University of New Haven. In the area of policy discourse around paying 
kidnappers’ ransoms, the conversation has shown promise and there are opportunities 
for more research around this topic. Many opportunities also exist for those who wish to 
engage in ethical debates on whether it is permissible to make ransom payments to 
kidnappers. What is lacking from discussions around kidnapping, and what this work 
seeks to fill in the gaps of, is how are armed group, insurgents, and other similar types 
of organizations effected by their choice of kidnapping? This author’s inquiry into how 
organizational structures of terror groups change based on their choice of tactics is an 
attempt to push the boundaries of the current understanding of kidnap for ransom.                      
 
2.7 Conclusion 
    Groups give protection, meaning, and value to our lives. Without them 
societies, cities, and nations would not be possible, and human life could not escape its 
primitive beginnings. They develop socializing features that promote the cohesion of its 
members and the accomplishment of goals. Norms are a socializing feature that related 
to a behavior that may be shared across a wide variety of identifies. Formalization is a 
measurement of how well things such as communication, rules, and duties are made 
explicit. Social Identity Theory is a method to scientifically analyze groups based on 
their behavior towards in-group and out-group members. 
 Hierarchy is one measure of organizational structure that is indicated by the 
degree to which those with ideological or political influence also have operational 
influence. Two important dimensions of understanding leadership are the degrees of 




building blocks of many contemporary terrorist organizations that exist to operationalize 
a unique task. Members of cells may form close personal bonds due to the tense and 
dangerous environments in which they work and commonly recruit from pre-existing 
relationships of family and friends. A terrorist group must pay close attention to the 
context in which they operate in addition to its organizational behavior. Competent 
leaders and middle managers are needed, as kidnapping requires detailed planning and 
organization to be sustained of a long period of time. Leaders must identify and mitigate 
risks to their enterprise, including such variables as: detection from CT authorities, the 
skillset and resources of their group, and a comprehensive understanding of the 
economic, political and social climate. Beyond the political, social, and economic forces 
present in an area, environmental, physical geography, and climate can play an 
important role in the planning of an attack or wider strategy. 
 If KfR is to become a viable ‘enterprise’ for armed groups, it will likely need to be 
profitable from the outset. When records are available, financial data on terrorist 
organizations can illuminate an otherwise shadowy topic. Its study is important because 
money is the lifeblood that nourishes every member of the body a terrorist group. A 
hallmark of terrorist cells is that in modern times they must provide their own funding 
due to a general lowering of state sponsorship since the end of the Cold War. Since that 
time, alternative funding sources including KfR, the narcotics trade, and smuggling of 
people and goods have become popular sources of revenue. A unique support feature 
to Islamic fundamentalist groups is the practice of funneling revenue through charities 
from zakat. Another such feature is the use of hawalas that allow currency to be 




monitored by governments. With the diversity of black-market funding sources and the 
ability to receive legitimate and ill-gotten money surreptitiously, it is difficult for CT 
authorities to follow the financing of terrorism. 
 To armed groups, KfR has a political value, which it does not to criminals. One 
attraction to this act is that it can simultaneously raise funds for other operations and 
increase fear in a populace that in turn de-legitimizes the government of the state. A 
second primary benefit to the kidnappers is that they can promote their cause through 
the publicity of a series of kidnappings or the abduction of a high-profile individual. The 
goal for insurgents is to convert their prisoner into political concessions from their 
hostage’s home country. Trust between negotiators and kidnappers is thin, but some 
trust must exist between the parties for an exchange to take place in order for hostages 
to return home. During this thrust and parry of negotiations, kidnappers have the upper 
hand because they hold a human life. Tzanelli identifies three ascending steps of 
increasing violence are the negotiating tactics of silence and threats towards the 
opposition negotiating team, abuse of the kidnaped victim, and murder of the kidnapped 
victim. Areas of the globe where KfR is most prolific are South Asia and northern Latin 










Kidnap for ransom is a ubiquitous phenomenon spread unevenly over our globe. 
It is a crime of opportunity and sometimes high volume whose culprits do not expect to 
be caught. There are somewhere between 25,000 and 100,000 reported kidnappings a 
year despite most of the incidents of KfR being unreported to government authorities.94 
In January 2014, the United Nations Security Council passed a unanimous resolution 
expressing concern about the increase in terrorist kidnapping for ransom due to the fact 
that current payments incentivize future kidnappings.95 This form of terrorism occurs in 
every part of the world, yet certain states have a notorious reputation for high incidence 
of KfR where the phenomenon is concentrated. Some authors suggest, through case 
studies and anecdotal evidence, that kidnapping epidemics are most likely to happen in 
corrupt, fragile states where violence is widespread.96 The phrases fragile state and 
failed states are often synonyms; however, this is a nebulous term with conceptual 
shortcomings that attempt to describe a wide variety of states with diverse challenges. 
Since the height in popularity of this view in the 1990s through 2000s institutions 
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including the UN, World Bank, and agencies within the American government have 
dropped use of the term in favor of other more descriptive ones.97 Kidnap for ransom is 
not an epidemic in all the places described above, so a more accurate understanding of 
and under what conditions it takes place is necessary.  
Ideology, target selection, and tactics filter the set of all actions a group could 
take to achieve its aims into a narrower set of likely options that group pursues. These 
decisions can lead down a path to kidnap for ransom as one of several tactics for 
achieving political goals. For this reason, in order to explore consequences of KfR, it is 
helpful to uncover how a terrorist organization comes to use this method of attack. In 
order to fulfill this objective, the plan of this chapter is to begin this chapter at a wide 
focus on the lens of ideology, proceed to a smaller focus of target selection, and then to 
the smallest lens of specific tactics commonly used by armed groups. What this will 
accomplish is to bring the reader from the literature review to explore the reason why a 
group may chose to kidnap to Chapter Four that will dive deep into two cases studies of 
dissimilar groups that practice KfR.           
 
3.2 The Role of Ideology in Target Selection 
 Ideology is the values, principles, beliefs, and objectives by which a group 
expresses its distinct political identity; thus, it is the bedrock on which actions are 
justified.98 Not all members of an organization will likely hold to a strict ideology. At the 
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lowest levels of the group because there will not always be enough true believers to 
effectively fill every position in particularly large organizations. Some people are drawn 
to the opportunity to enrich themselves, gain status, or acquire protection from a 
dominant organization in their area counter to the government. This explains the 
difference between the professed political ideology of a group and the actual political 
ideology of its members.99 We can see this pattern in many armed groups. Ideology 
sets bounds for target selection and use of tactics; however, different political ideologies 
arrange those boundaries varyingly from others. Cultural and historic traditions can 
make ideological imperatives less straightforward. Maoism rests upon China’s distinct 
historical trajectory apart from Europe that leaves it linked to but separate from older 
European variants of Marxism. Prominent political ideologies include: ethno-
nationalist/separatist, religious, left-wing, and right-wing beliefs, yet not all categories 
are mutually exclusive.  
Ideology is extremely important to a group’s worldview. It is the lens by which 
members view their surroundings, interpret current events and history, and what and 
how they classify as enemies — even those who do not give a thought to the terrorist’s 
mission. For instance, in 1977 the PIRA carried out a short-term assassination 
campaign against businessmen on the grounds that their companies helped support the 
British ‘occupation’ of Northern Ireland.100 Doubtless, those who were murdered did not 
likely have any sense their daily work related to Britain’s governance of the country.  
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 Once a political group decides to use violence, it must determine who and what 
to attack.101 Their ideology determines who their ‘enemies’ are typically based on 
concepts of ‘goodness’, ‘badness’, ‘innocence’, and ‘guilt’. Terrorist organizations 
generally understand the world in a Manichean manner with themselves as proper 
arbiters of right and wrong. These sometimes-complex determinations result in what are 
called ‘legitimate targets’, which can be extremely controversial if that mark is also a 
‘soft targets’ that are not regularly defended. Soft targets are installations such as 
schools, hospitals, cinemas or shopping centers that are public areas where many 
people congregate with few security forces on guard. To many people these moral 
judgments are radical and troubling and that view is not lost on those who believe them. 
Another PIRA member explained to Tony Parker, “I don’t expect to be judged by your 
rules: if Brits do that, then they’ll see the IRA as a bunch of ruthless maniacs which by 
their definition I suppose we are…The IRA has its own logic and oh no it’s not yours.”102 
 A specific example of the difference between terrorist ‘exceptional’ behavior and 
the mainline judgments of society is the April 1991 assassination of Detlev Rhowedder 
by the German Rote Armee Faktion / Red Army Faction (RAF) also known as the 
Baader-Meinhof-Gruppe. Here, ‘exceptional’ means a law or social norm that a political 
ideology claims it is not bound by because those laws are illegitimate or because the 
radicals are only accountable to a higher law. Rohwedder was the head of the German 
federal agency responsible for privatizing firms owned by the former DDR, a former 
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State Secretary in the FDR Economics Ministry, and earlier a manager at Hoechst 
Chemical.103 In a communiqué according to the RAF, Rohwedder was killed for, in their 
words, his decades of work as an “armchair murderer” who in the “interest of power and 
profits plans the misery and death of millions of human beings”.104 Additionally, by killing 
Rohwedder the RAF was protesting the annexation of East Germany and making, again 
in their words, a moral act. The Rohwedder murder indicates how terrorist acts are used 
to label victims guilty and deserving of judgement outside any established court of 
law.105 Crucially this condemnation of the perceived enemy is essential to the mindset of 
the radicals who use violence. It absolves them of wrong doing in their own eyes, to 
their supporters, and hopefully in the opinion of uncommitted observers whose support 
will be necessary to a successful campaign.106 Not many people can bear the belief that 
their actions, especially violent actions, are wrong or harmful to others. This is why the 
belief that an enemy is guilty is so important for the continuation of a terror strategy. 
 Another important consequence of ideology is the transformation of people and 
objects into representative symbols for the terrorist.107 In the words of one loyalist 
interviewed from Northern Ireland who bombed a public house in 1974, “We 
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dehumanized the other side and branded them animals. We didn’t think of them in 
terms of them being people. If we couldn’t get to the IRA, we would have to slaughter 
members of the Catholic community who after all seemed to support them.”108 No doubt 
it becomes easier to murder when one dehumanizes the enemy. Using pejorative 
names at the enemy is common practice of viewing people as representative symbols of 
the enemy. In Northern Ireland loyalists sometimes disparagingly call Catholics “taigs” 
and republicans refer to local soldiers as ‘Brits’.  
 Of course, the act of assigning guilt to the enemy and symbolizing individuals as 
representatives of that enemy is not exclusive to terrorism, for is it also common in 
warfare. Glenn Gray says, “The basic aim of a nation at war in establishing an image of 
the enemy is to distinguish as sharply as possible the act of killing from the act of 
murder by making of the former an act deserving all honor and praise.”109 American 
soldiers and Italian soldiers fought and killed each other during the Second World War, 
yet they had little personal animosity towards one another as individuals. Churchill 
justified British aerial bombing on German cities for revenge for the Blitz on London and 
justly due for the “malignancy” of the German people.110 Michael Walzer famously cited 
the bombing of German cities later in the war as a violation of Just War Theory since 
there was no longer a “supreme emergency” of a power hostile to the existence of the 
British state. That is, by late 1944 it was clear the Germans would lose the war; 
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therefore, the continued attack on civilians was unethical.111 With the right ideology 
liberal republics are just as able to dehumanize their enemies as terrorist organizations.  
       One does not need to have done anything to be designated a suitable target 
by a terrorist. Merely being oneself can be enough to receive harm from the perspective 
of some.112 Crenshaw remarks how during the Algerian Revolution (1954-1962) the FLN 
regarded bombings against European civilians as legitimate because they represent 
French colonial occupation in that country. In France the strategy of attacking European 
civilians had the consequence of dividing public opinion on the war then eventually 
turning public opinion against continued military action in North Africa. In another case, 
a bomb exploded where the Delegation of Argentine-Israeli Association and the 
Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association were lodging in July 1994. When a Lebanese 
authority on Hezbollah was asked why this attack did not take place in Israel, he replied 
how it makes no difference where an attack occurs, only that it is against Jews.113 
Regardless of one’s race, nationality, or religion it is possible to be targeted despite 
seemingly no blameworthy action. 
 A final ability of ideology on terrorism closely connected to, but different from 
attributes listed above, is what could be called ‘guilt deflection’ and victim blaming for 
the occurrence of violent attacks.114 This means the guilt most people would ascribe to 
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perpetrators of violence is ‘deflected’ by radicals to the physical target (person, persons, 
or building) or psychological target as an “inevitable” and unavoidable action.115 For 
example, Abu Iyad attributed the 1972 kidnapping and murder of Israeli athletes by 
Black September at the Munich Olympics to the international community’s failure to 
recognize the plight of Palestinians. Furthermore, he claimed the deaths of nine of the 
hostages during the standoff with police at Furstenfeldbruck Airport was due to their 
attempt to rescue the captives and failure to meet the demands of the Palestinian 
separatists. Here, the hostage-takers used a simplistic cause-and-effect perspective 
that places blame on parties directly and indirectly involved in their confrontation with 
police while taking no responsibility for their own actions. 
 However, ideology is not all what it seems, and armed groups certainly do take 
into account practical concerns, but they can also make mistakes with respect to tactical 
choice and target selection. Target selection may be straightforward when an enemy is 
walking down the street. Bishop and Mallie assert PIRA initiating the killing of British 
soldiers in 1987 was far from an innovation in tactics. It simply acknowledged much 
earlier republican ideology and common practice against a traditional enemy.116 In 
November 1987 a PIRA spokesmen declared no local unit needed permission to attack 
British soldiers; although, it could be said this action was tacit permission granted for 
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future attacks.117 On the other hand, sometimes an ideological justification is produced 
after an attack is complete. Moss reminds us that most communiqués from the Brigate 
Rosse / Red Brigades (BR) claiming responsibility for attacks was released after press 
coverage had begun. This was likely done for the sake of tailoring their message to best 
capture the wave of media coverage that maximized the BR’s intended communicative 
goal.118 Indeed, Wilson claims that after shooting and wounding the incorrect target, a 
communiqué was rewritten to claim the wrong person was indeed the intended target.119 
 The influence of ideology on armed groups can be seen by which targets groups 
choose to focus their efforts; this is most easily recognized by comparing data sets on 
attacks.120 Northern Ireland offers a unique case to explore the differences between 
republican separatists and loyalist forces operating in the same geographic area and at 
the same time. Naturally, separatists tend to attack those whom they view as supporting 
or assisting  the British “occupation” of Ireland in that country, on Great Britain, and at 
one point on the Continent.121 Loyalists use violence to protect the existing state of 
affairs while also use violence against forces subversive to state interests.122 In this 
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sense loyalist radicals were ‘conservative’ insomuch as while they used radical means 
they did so to protect the established political order. What severely complicated the 
mission of loyalist radicals was their inability to accurately recognize republican forces 
and their supporters. A result of this was the frequent indiscriminate targeting of 
ordinary Catholics in the belief that they were active supporters of republicanism, or 
they were at least culpable for not pressuring the Provisionals to end hostilities.123 
Survey data suggests many ordinary Protestants were also suspicious about casual 
support of the PIRA from their Catholics neighbors’.124 This was one issue the PIRA did 
not face because British security forces were easy to identify. 
 Table 1 is a visual representation of the differences between left-wing and right-
wing terrorism acts based on who they attacked from republican and loyalist forces. 
What it indicates is a large number of attacks against security forces, as has been 
mentioned before, a great number of bystanders killed, and although attacks against 
buildings are not specifically recorded it is included in the large number of “Others”. A 
majority of attacks from loyalists were directed at civilian Catholics plus a small number 
of political activists and republican radicals. By and large violent sectarian attacks 
shown in this table come from loyalists with outliers directed against sectarian allies. 
Conversely, violent attacks from republican forces are more numerous across all 
categories. 
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 Interestingly, there can also be targeting differences in groups with similar 
ideologies as seen in Table 2 below which catalogues attacks by the BR and RAF. 
While both groups shared Marxist-Leninist beliefs, they did have distinct differences in 
their particular goals that are evident in whom they attacked. Likely due to their heritage 
as a splinter group of the Communist Party, the BR placed a much greater priority on 
the overthrow of the Italian state.125 Conversely, the German RAF with its more 
anarchist worldview put greater emphasis on upending the international capitalist global 
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order.126 As the table below indicates the RAF selected high profile targets of business 
executives, government officials, and U.S. military personnel; however, they eschewed 
attacking low-level bureaucrats and ordinary police officers. This reflected the RAF’s 
internationalist goals as opposed to national aims of overthrowing the West German 
government.127 On the contrary, Italian leftist radicals originated in the factories of 
northern Italy and their rage was primarily directed against factory managers, junior 
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 Ideology is not the only explanation for differences between who the BR and RAF 
attacked and how many attacks took place. For instance, the BR had many more 
members than the RAF so it could take a far greater number of actions against its 
adversaries. With fewer resources one might expect the RAF to attack less high-profile 
targets that would presumably not be well protected; however, due to their ideological 
bent they chose not to pursue more practical objectives.129 While ideology is far from 
the only consideration of a terrorist organization, in terms of planning, it is nevertheless 
significant for how a group judges the nature of people and institutions while also setting 
parameters on how it conducts its own actions.  
 
3.3 The Role of Strategy on Target Selection 
 Terrorism is one of several strategies, both violent and non-violent, a group may 
use to achieve its political goals. While conditional to its resources, an organization may 
pursue a variety of strategies including: peaceful protests, putting forward candidates for 
elected office, conventional warfare, or revolutions. Here, strategy is the plan any 
person or group uses to organize and then deploy its resources to achieve political 
objectives.130 The strategic objectives of terrorism are not the same as political 
objectives, but the long-term results against an enemy to inflict physical and 
psychological violence on a target audience.131 Success in a terrorist campaign requires 
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the correct amount of “pressure and encouragement” directed against a target 
population in order to secure a desired outcome.132 It is normal for an organization to 
change strategies to counter the adaptations of security forces or the evolving political 
climate to achieve its goals. Upon the announcement of a ceasefire in August 1994, a 
Sinn Fein representative claimed, “One thing we all know is that the struggle is not over. 
We are into a new and important phase in the struggle.”133 This ceasefire would last 
until 1996, but in the meantime the struggle for a united Ireland would continue by other 
means. 
            In reality it can be difficult to predict the reaction a terrorist attack will have in the 
short term or the long term. Groups do not want to alienate their supporters or accept a 
reprisal from CT authorities that would prove devastating to their survival. For these 
reasons selecting a target and tactic should be made carefully to strike the right balance 
of daringness and carefulness to maximize strategic advantage. Good use of media can 
amplify the achievement of a successful assault or lower the publicity of a botched 
mission.  
 The strategic planning of an act of terrorism can be thought to exist along a 
horizontal axis, with one end representing ‘spectacle’ purposes and the opposite end 
representing ‘practical’ ones, with specific acts being positioned somewhere in-between 
this “symbolic/practical” continuum. Near the “symbolic” pole lie terrorist acts of the 
Anarchist movement in the 19th through early 20th centuries and the saran gas attack on 
the Tokyo subway by Aum Shinrikyo. Such displays were undoubtedly logical to the 
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attackers but also highly spectacular134 Closer to the “practical” end of this continuum is 
the 1983 Beirut bombing on the American and French barracks. The Americans and 
French were members of an international peacekeeping mission, but they were seen by 
the local Shia population as actually siding with the Israelis and Christian militias during 
Lebanon’s civil war. This was a dramatic attack by Islamic Jihad, but the planners also 
had a specific goal in mind—to push out the foreigners. So, some armed groups pursue 
strategic objectives in a detailed, careful manner, and others pursue their strategic goals 
through a garish spectacle with no immediate particular aim besides creating fear.   
 An example of crafting the strategic process can be seen in the Peruvian group 
Sendero Luminoso Shining Path (SL) that developed principles derived from Maoist 
ideology in its fight against the Peruvian government. The fundamental principle of Mao 
Tse-tung’s military philosophy is guerrilla warfare: this is warfare practiced against a 
superior force composed of light forces using hit-and-run tactics in a war of attrition until 
the guerrilla force can overtake the formerly superior force in open battle. This is 
different than terrorism in that terrorism is, much more than guerilla warfare, designed to 
engage in a psychological struggle against an enemy that generally causes physical 
damage, and cannot defeat a traditional military force by that method alone. However, 
terrorism can be used by groups that practice guerrilla warfare.  
 Mao developed this viewpoint in the 1930s due to China’s overwhelmingly rural 
population of peasants; this majority rural demographic persisted until as recently as 
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2011.135 136 His belief in the peasantry as a revolutionary force is in direct contrast to 
older Marxist-Leninist ideology which held urban laborers were the only revolutionary 
class.137 In this regard the role of the Chinese Communist Party would be to mobilize 
peasants in the initial pockets the communists controlled. Such mobilization consisted of 
recruiting new members and material in an area safe from attack by the Nationalist and 
later Japanese enemy forces.138 Given the disparity between Mao’s small communist 
movement versus his larger enemy, his strategy was to play defense while harassing 
the advancing opponent. As an enemy marched deeper into communist territory and 
extended its lines of supply the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and guerillas would 
attack at that point when the enemy’s military is most vulnerable in the field.139 
Concurrently, communist forces advanced into new villages to spread their political 
message, acquire more resources, and enroll fresh recruits for their struggle. In the final 
stage of the war the spirited PLA riding high on a string of small victories pressed the 
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enemy in the cities where they were based to conclude the war by victories in open 
battle.140 
 Despite the numerous revolutionaries Mao inspired, he believed his strategy that 
defeated the Japanese and Kuomintang was less important than a country’s geography, 
social history, economics, and relative strength of adversary.141 He thought few 
principles from other conflicts could be generally applied to military science. One such 
disciple of the Maoist tradition was the SL of Peru. 
 For the approximately 25 years SL was active it followed a rural revolutionary 
strategy based on Mao’s example; in fact, the founder of SL, Abimeal Guzmán, has 
gone so far as proclaiming himself the intellectual heir of Mao.142 Consciously aware of 
their own environment, SL has grafted beliefs and grievances of the Andean Quechua 
Indians to conventional Maoist ideology to appeal to those indigenous people so they 
can maintain a base of support in Ayacucho Province.143 144 In addition to this 
departure, they have not avoided terrorist acts in Lima. For the first ten years of group’s 
existence, Guzman focused on building support for their movement with the rural 
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population in remote Ayacucho.145 Beginning in 1980 SL commenced what Smith calls 
“a thousand little wars across the Andes”.146 Every one of these “thousand wars” 
consisted of displacing institutions of traditional life not only including attacking 
government officials but also priests, teachers, businessmen, and judges, i.e. pillars of 
status quo society.147 
 To subdue the countryside, upon entering a community SL identifies the most 
unpopular person and the most respected person. Once this is determined they kill the 
former and persuade the later, through intimidation or exile if necessary, to cooperate or 
to at least not interfere with the new order of things.148 On occasions, for instance when 
a religious community, village, or development project interfered with the plans of the SL 
or vied for the loyalty of local residents, the group has executed full-scale massacres to 
enforce single-minded loyalty to their cause.149 Amazingly, in 1989 over three-quarters 
of deaths caused by the SL were among rural Peruvians and the urban poor — the 
natural constituency the group needs to appeal to for its long-term success.150 Such 
attacks are in addition to guerilla violence against police, military, and government 
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officials who must be forced from areas SL wants to occupy before its assault on 
Lima.151 
 Since the growth in Lima’s population by country dwellers emigrating to the city, 
SL has begun to perform urban operations. To this end it has also attempted to 
organize urban cells and developed social programs for new residents of the city 
simultaneously attacking different programs sponsored by other organizations.152 Part of 
this urban strategy in Lima involved exploding car bombs in the city to undermine 
confidence in the police to keep public order.153  
     Generally, Shining Path has adhered to the established Maoist military 
strategy by establishing areas of control in rural regions with an aim at isolating the 
cities until they are most vulnerable for capture. SL adopted this strategy to fit the 
particular conditions of Peru co-opting indigenous peoples’ grievances and bringing the 
fight to Lima. In September 1994 the Peruvian government captured Guzmán initiating a 
slow decline of SL that reached a nadir from 2010 to 2012 when many remaining 
leaders were killed or captured.  
 
3.4 Target Protection 
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 One practical problem with terrorist operations is how well a target is protected. 
Some targets such as ordinary civilians and shopping malls have no defenses at all. On 
the other hand, other targets like banks and senior politicians are nowadays afforded 
enough security to make an attack costly for the terrorist or at minimum able to 
withstand a violent incident. 
 A dictum regarding terrorism is that no target can be perfectly protected so 
opportunities for political violence will always exist. This is at its core an economic 
problem of limited resources available for target protection. During the worst period of 
terrorism in Italy from the mid 1970s to the early 1990s, the security services reportedly 
provided 3.681 bodyguards for 671 individual judges, politicians, and business 
executives.154 Similarly, a 1990 audit of London’s Metropolitan Police found that 
personal protection costs accounted for over five percent of the department’s total 
spending.155 The best protection cannot be given to everyone, and if it were it would not 
be without gaps that would be exploited.  
 A second rule that can be applied to target protection is that, the less public 
knowledge that is known about a potential target, the better that is for its safety. Armed 
groups cannot attack someone if they do not know where or when a target will be at a 
specific location. Naturally, this is a problem for public figures such as high-ranking 
politicians, religious leaders, and noted activists who are widely covered by the media or 
use social media themselves. Wurth notes that business executives who believe 
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themselves targets should remove their telephone numbers and home addresses from 
public records; although, it may be impossible to not keep an online presence. Indeed, 
in 1987 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was touring British inner cities, but for her 
safety specific times and locations of her appointments were kept out of the papers.156 
Individuals working in embassies are sometimes located in dangerous host countries 
and are desirable targets due to their nature as representatives of foreign states, yet for 
effectiveness in their job embassy employees must be open to interact with the public.  
A distinction can be made between static targets, that remain in place for a long 
period of time, and mobile ones which frequently move between destinations.157 The 
most obvious example of a static target is a building – although preferably one highly 
trafficked or with symbolism. A person may also be a static target when they are giving 
a speech or in a meeting; moreover, examples of this sort include several attempts 
made on Adolf Hitler’s life most notable of which was the July Plot at Hitler’s Wolf 
Lair.158 Mobile targets are most commonly modes of transportation including airplanes, 
trains, automobiles, and their occupants while in motion. Urban targets are the third 
category of targets such as a town that may have specific targets like factories; 
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however, the entire town can still be in danger. For the sake of relevance this study will 
only focus on mobile targets because static and urban targets cannot be kidnapped.  
Transit is a popular time to attack a mobile target because during this period it is 
at a vulnerable position.159 Automobile targets are weak because, if attacked, they are 
not easy to hide, their movement is restricted by road traffic, it is difficult to get 
assistance to them when under fire, they are easy to ambush, and the movement of 
human passengers are within the vehicle.160 If a terrorist group knows where someone 
lives and works that gives it valuable information that can be used for an ambush. The 
more a group learns about that target’s route the greater the advantage it has for a 
successful mission.  
When planning an attack, a crucial piece of information about a target is knowing 
where and when they will be at an unsecure, vulnerable location.161 Therefore, the aim 
of the protective service defending a potential target is to prevent attackers from 
acquiring that information if not by keeping a low profile then by not publicizing that 
news.162 Another defensive tactic is altering driving routes in addition to departure and 
arrival times to disrupt routine schedules so movements are less predictable. During the 
Troubles in Northern Ireland, judges were known to change driving routes to their 
 
159. H.A. Lyons and H.J. Harbinson, “A Comparison of Political and Non-Political 
Murders in Northern Ireland”, Medicine, Science and the Law 26, no. 3 (1986): 195. 
  
160. G. Capotorto, “How Terrorists Look at Kidnappings” in Terrorism and 
Personal Protection, ed. Brian Michael Jenkins (Stoneham, MA: Butterworth, 1985), 5. 
   
161. Anthony J. Scotti, “Transportation Security”, in Terrorism and Personal 
Protection, ed. Brian Michael Jenkins (Stoneham, MA: Butterworth, 1985), 361. 
  





offices and even switch vehicles between their homes’ and court buildings.163 However, 
as the editor of International Security Review, Tony Slinn observed, “You may change 
your route to work each day, but when you drive out of your front gate, you’ve got to 
turn either right or left, and the terrorists know that too”.164 For this reason most 
kidnappings take place near the target’s residence, according to Clutterbuck.165 
Once a target is selected the next step for a terrorist is to penetrate any 
protection, human or construction, that target has defending it. The correct approach to 
such defensive measures depends on whether the goal of the attack is to kill or capture. 
If the target should be killed then any method will work so long as it achieves that 
objective and does not violate any other priority, e.g. injuring children. For a capture 
operation, a terrorist group will likely need a more sophisticated plan that avoids 
seriously injuring the target or the kill or capture of comrades. Mobile human targets 
may have a variety of defenses. In the case of an unarmed civilian, an assassination 
can be carried out simply enough with a small number of attackers and simple 
weapons. In the west the most popular weapon of choice are firearms.166 In 1971 police 
and the British Army began wearing body armor while on patrol.167 A PIRA spokesman 
 
163. “Nightmare for the Judges on a 24-hour Vigil”, The Guardian (London, UK) 
January 6, 1988. 
  
164. Ibid. 
   
165. Richard Clutterbuck, Kidnap, Hijack and Extortion: The Response (London, 
UK: Macmillan, 1987), 81.  
166. See supra note, 106. 
  
167. Michael Dewar, The British Army in Northern Ireland: 1969 to Present 





admitted that after this policy was initiated it was then harder to kill protective 
personnel.168 
An attack planned against a protected mobile target, likely an armored car, will 
need a sophisticated plan and some knowledge of how the reinforced target is 
designed. Common reinforcements will include: bulletproof glass, run-flat tires, 
reinforced paneling, thick armor encasing the fuel tank and engine. Such a vehicle is 
temporarily able to deflect bullets with a high probability of escape to safety and to call 
for assistance. Although this type of automobile is valuable for its impressive capabilities 
it is not without limits. Famously, in December 1973 a car carrying the Spanish Prime 
Minister, Admiral Carrero Blanco and his driver, were lifted over a five-story church after 
a large bomb was detonated beneath a street by ETA. 
If the terrorist attack is a kidnapping, a major concern for the attackers of a high 
priority target are the presence of bodyguards. Of course not all judges, business 
executive, legislators should be expected to have protection, but some will be heavily 
protected.169 The role of a bodyguard is to take evasive action when an attack is 
immanent; however, if an attack occurs bodyguards must put themselves between 
danger and their client.170 Additionally, if the target is in transit, attackers must expect 
their target’s automobile to be accompanied by a second vehicle filled with men who are 
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firearm trained.171 In these instances a team of gunmen must quickly neutralize the 
accompanying vehicle and those in the target’s car without seriously injuring the mark. 
When those plotting terrorism are presented with a target protected by strong 
defenses, they have three options: to give up completely, strike by other means, or 
attack a different target altogether.172 It is difficult to measure how much defensive 
measures deter violence because we cannot know about attacks that do not happen. 
Studies have suggested the overt presence of security guards is a key factor thieves 
account for when planning to rob a bank.173 Although danger may discourage criminals 
from illegal activity, it may not dissuade those with political motivations. In fact, a 
successful attack on a well-defended target would be a triumphal coup for someone 
who could pull off such a bold assault due to the huge amount of media attention that 
could be generated. By scoring a victory against one of the enemy’s hard targets violent 
groups wish to create a sense of omnipresence in society. 
The measures armed groups take to overcome formidable defenses can come in 
the form of overwhelming force through superior firepower or completely circumventing 
fortifications. An example of bypassing protection by negating the effectiveness of a 
fortification is the wooden horse the Greek coalition used to secretly invade the city of 
Troy in ancient Greek folklore. One popular method of overcoming protective barriers is 
using an automobile as a battering ram. A significant drawback of this tactic is that the 
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driver and other passengers in the vehicle will almost certainly die. For this reason, it is 
no deterrent for suicide bombers. We can see the disregard for one’s own life in 
exchange for the success of a mission by Hamas and Islamic Jihad suicide attacks in 
the West Bank, Gaza and Israel proper during the mid 1990s. Bombers in those attacks 
simply walked or drove alongside the target concerned, and then detonated the bomb-
killing killer and query.174 Defensive measures are unlikely to deter individuals willing to 
forgo their lives for a cause. 
Circumventing protective countermeasures requires moving around defenses 
rather than using sheer force to penetrate through them. For instance, if attacking an 
embassy, one could make a diversionary attack to draw away the instillation’s guards to 
more easily enter the facility. This scenario occurred at the American embassy in 
Nairobi in 1998 during an al Qaeda attack. If the identity of the target is general rather 
than specific, circumventing defenses can take the form of attacking a similar target 
where it is less safe.175 The PIRA took this approach as they found it more difficult to kill 
British soldiers in Northern Ireland; consequently, they targeted them in England and 
the Continent. Between January 1988 and December 1990, they murdered 21 service 
members outside of Northern Ireland versus 39 in the country.176                    
As well as modifying the method of attack, strong protective measures can 
encourage attackers to choose a different target entirely. This process has been 
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examined by economists using econometrics to explain patterns in international 
terrorism.177 They concluded that ‘terrorists’ will, ceteris paribus, nearly always attack 
the softest target commensurate with their goals on the basis that overcoming 
countermeasures – measured in time, resources, and risk – is lower.178 Their 
conclusions rest on the assumption that those who commit acts of terror are rational 
actors who maximize utility and minimize cost by responding to market changes. 
Economists studied the effects on security after American embassies were fortified 
since 1976 and the installation of metal detectors in American and other airports 
beginning in the early 1973.179 Those countermeasures led to decreased attacks on the 
installations that implemented them, yet did not lead to fewer attacks overall because 
armed groups would instead attack other soft targets, e.g. shopping malls or places of 
worship. There was no aggregate decrease in violence unless a reduction in resources 
available to armed groups also occurred by CT authorities. In economic terms, we might 
call this phenomenon a substitution good. As consumers may purchase more chicken 
as fish becomes more expensive, gunmen will attack more subway stations as train 
stations become more secure. There are signs that as aircraft hijackings decreased 
after security improved in airports non-aircraft hostage-taking increased as a 
substitute.180 
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3.5 Factors Associated with Violent Crime and Kidnap for Ransom 
Anecdotal evidence and case studies suggest certain domestic factors including 
high amounts of corruption, poor economic conditions, high levels of violence are 
associated with higher incidence of KfR. States that are often recently cited as 
examples of experiencing kidnapping epidemics are Afghanistan, Colombia, and Iraq.  
Another factor possibly contributing to the bad reputation of above-mentioned states is 
lack of reporting to authorities of kidnapping incidents, which makes it impossible for CT 
experts to bring perpetrators to justice and save victims.181 Pires, Guerette, and Shariati 
tested for these “contextual variables” they claim might enable KfR epidemics in diverse 
parts of the globe.182 For instance, in Colombia during the 1990s as much as 99 percent 
of kidnappers were never apprehended for their crimes.183 Such low reporting rates 
might reflect citizens’ distrust in their government because they believe that officials are 
ineffective or corrupt. If police are unwilling to pursue kidnappers and the state’s 
prosecution is unable to obtain a conviction, victims of crime are likely unwilling to report 
inflicted abuses. For such reasons countries with high levels of corruption are also more 
likely to be unable to suppress rampant KfR.  
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 A majority of studies on the connection between poor economic opportunity and 
violent crime indicate a strong relationship does not exist; this is despite the intuition 
that few financial prospects may lead individuals to turn towards rash ways to make 
easy money.184 To the contrary, most research on this matter actually indicates that 
crime increase as economies grow – for reasons too numerous to delve into.185 What 
comes to mind is the rise in crime in many states where industrialization began in the 
19th century. Tourism, especially tourists from affluent nations, is one such economic 
activity that may put states at greater risk to KfR.186 It is true that the majority of kidnap 
victims are locals, however Western hostages command a high price for their release 
from captivity. Indeed, Islamic fundamentalist armed groups covet Westerners because 
these groups make most of their kidnapping revenue from this demographic.               
 The final hypothesis offered by Pires, Guerette, and Shariati, in addition to the 
two mentioned above as drivers of kidnap for ransom, concerns the amount of violent 
crime measured in annual murders. It may sound self-evident, but states that suffer 
from high levels of one type of violent crime, including   murder, are also victim to other 
types of violent crime such as KfR.187 Put more simply, regions where murder or rape 
are endemic should see a correlation with other acts of violence. A person who is willing 
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to do violence against another person is probably not someone who has ethical qualms 
against committing a different violent act. To offer an illustration, when Colombia 
suffered widespread homicide in the 1980s through the early 2000s, it simultaneously 
experienced prevalent levels of kidnap for ransom.188 The execution of hostages alone 
could not fully explain an elevated homicide rate in Colombia because that would mean 
kidnappers are killing all valuable captives. High rates of KfR may be emblematic of 
police effectiveness or lack of public trust in their police. In the sense that if CT 
authorities or police are unable to suppress kidnapping it is likely they will also be 
unable quell homicide and terrorism.189 
 The Pires, Guerette, and Shariati paper is the first to systematic study which 
economic, social, political, and security variables contribute to high levels of kidnap for 
ransom within a given state. It used a case-control design that compared states with 
many cases of KfR (experimental group) to ones with few cases of KfR (control group); 
unsurprisingly, they found that nations with elevated levels of kidnap for ransom on 
average were less peaceful, less secure, and had uneven economic distribution within 
society.190 Specifically, of the fifteen variables they found five significant tested in the 
study, three security-related, one social-related, and one economic-related. Security & 
Society a variable measuring a variety of interconnected “factors such as perception of 
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criminality, violent crime, incarceration, and security officers and police.”191 Security 
Apparatus measures “how much authority governments are able to exert over their 
countries” like the Weberian dictum about what constitutes a state.192 193 Global 
Terrorism Index measures “the number of terrorist incidents, fatalities, injuries, and 
property damage” of 162 states that are then ranked by amount of damage done and 
includes 99.6 of global population.194 Global Peace Index aggregate “measures national 
peacefulness” through a composite index including 162 nations that are ranked.195 It, 
along with the Global Terrorism Index were produced by Vision of Humanity, an 
enterprise of the Institute of Economics and Peace. Finally, Uneven Economic 
Development is a composite index that measures how “governments are inconsistent in 
the fulfillment of their social and economic obligations.”196 
 A map of the states compared in the Pires, Guerette, and Shariati study is shown 
below in Figure 1.  
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These cases were selected from data acquired by the authors, but created by IKV PAX 
Christi, an organization that works in 15 countries to promote peace and justice. We can 
see most regions of the globe are represented save Europe and Southeast Asia.  
Recently, hotspots of kidnappings where the highest numbers of attacks occur 
are confined to a handful of states. Two noteworthy cases where this has recently 
occurred are Iraq and Afghanistan since the coalition invasion and occupation due to 
the toppling of those former governments. Perhaps the most widely recognized country 
with a ubiquitous kidnapping phenomenon is Columbia sometimes known as the 
“kidnapping capital of the world.”197 Other hotspots are Russia, Philippines, Nigeria, 
India, and Nepal where there are violent separatist movements or religious extremists. 
In previous decades left-wing radicals heavily targeted Latin America and Europe. 
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It is reassuring to know that earlier presumptions on which factors contribute to 
kidnap for ransom have been verified in a systematic method; yet this work is not 
enough to fully explain why KfR problems occur in some places but not others. Another 
likely difference between areas with KfR problems and those areas without KfR 
problems not discussed above is the opportunities and incentives for dark networks to 
commit kidnappings. That is, terrorist organization Z may operate in two states (A and 
B) with high and low rates of KfR, but Z may find it more advantageous to commit 
different crimes based on the effectiveness of local police. For example, money 
laundering might be more likely to take place in developed states where financial 
markets are more mature and rule of law well established, whereas KfR might be more 
likely to take place where financial markets are immature and the rule of law is weak.198 
 
3.6 Anatomy of a Kidnapping 
Although there is no standard method to conduct a kidnap, recent attacks by the 
group al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) follow a similar pattern, according to 
Dutton.199  
First, the terrorist group generally minimizes the risk to group members by 
outsourcing the initial hostage-taking to criminal organizations working on a 
commission. Once the terrorist group receives the hostages, it then observes a 
long period of silence designed to create some panic among the hostage’s loved 
ones. Thereafter, negotiations for a ransom begin, often with a video showing the 
hostages begging their governments to pay for the hostage’s safe release. 
Additional videos usually follow showing the hostages surrounded by armed 
guards in an effort to reinforce the group’s message that the hostage will be 
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executed if their demands are not met. Ransom negotiations...can drag on for 
months or even years. Payments to the terrorist group often happen with the aid 
of third-party [sic] intermediaries who negotiate and facilitate the transfer of 
ransom payments into a designated bank account or through an alternative 
remittance system, such as a hawala.   
 
Hawala, literally meaning remittance, is an informal method to send money that does 
not use formal financial institutions such as a bank or credit union.  
 According to Tzanelli, the modus operandi of kidnap for ransom is “converting 
one thing (the victim) into another (money).200 However, so-called terrorist kidnappings 
are committed in the name of a greater cause than the simple accumulation of 
economic capital, they exist to reach a means to a greater end. That is, they have 
value-oriented reason a belief in a system of values for their own sake. An example of 
this phenomenon is kidnapping of foreigners by Iraqi insurgences that made money 
from capturing foreigners for the higher goal of liberating their country from coalition 
forces. It has also been observed that kidnapers consider their victims as a commodity 
that should be treated carefully for the purpose of maximizing profit through sale on the 
market. For instance, one man (“Alexander”) who was kidnapped with a business 
colleague by the FARC in April 2000 remarked of his kidnappers: “The guerillas were 
extremely respectful […] They took care of us like an investment. The commander said, 
“If you feel sick, if someone lacks respect, I’m here to help. The only thing you [must] 
have is patience.”” “Alexander’s” description of his kidnapper’s polite behavior presents 
their actions as a rational tactic to protect their ‘goods’ from damage. However, there is 
no generic template that makes a standard kidnapping because the variables in each 
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case, including: modus operandi of the particular group, geographic location, 
effectiveness of local CT authorities and law enforcement, the presence of rule of law, 
how the kidnappers wish to be paid, etc. Below is a visual representation of one 
possible KfR scenario from the Financial Action Task Force, an independent, inter-
governmental body that develops policies and advocates protecting the global financial 
system.201 
 
In kidnapping negotiations, trust acts as a contract between the kidnappers and 
the negotiating party over which the kidnappers have control.202 Tzanelli divides the 
actions of the kidnappers to the kidnapped into the categories of: threats and silence to 
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the negotiating opposing negotiating team, application of abuse to the victim, and 
murder of the captive.203 Threats and silence are more favorable to the second party 
negotiating for the release of the captive than abuse, physical or non-physical, or 
murder. Silence is a negotiating tactic that injects a new element of uncertainty to the 
dialogue when heretofore an impasse was reached between parties. It was the effect of 
reminding the second party of the value of the captured person and of the potential 
harm that may be currently inflicted on the captured person. These suspicions by the 
second party have the desired effect of leading to resuming negotiations and a quick 
delivery of ransom to the kidnappers an overall more favorable outcome for them. 
Abuse is an intermediary step between threats/silence and murder that asserts 
the power of the captors Murder of captives may seem a senseless act because it 
destroys the ‘goods’ naturally ending any possibility of a financial transaction, but it 
actually indicates that (1) even outlaws have their own code of conduct and (2) the 
kidnappers want to save face by keeping their threats of violence credible.204 In this way 
a murder of a captive for which kidnappers do not receive payment serves as a ‘self-
compensation’ because they still retain the ‘integrity’ of their word towards the opposing 
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Sometimes kidnappings end with a hostage’s government, company, or loved 
ones paying the requested ransom to the hostage takers. Authorities commonly pay 
requested ransom demands despite contrary statements although the details are not 
often made public and governments generally deny this policy.206 For instance, there 
are  conflicting accounts about whether France paid €20 million for four male hostages 
captured by AQIM who were working in Niger for the French nuclear energy group, 
Areva.207 A relative of a hostage who remained in captivity recounted that she was told 
that, while the government would not pay the ‘terrorists’, Areva was free to do so.208 
However, others claim the sum was paid by France’s secret service.209 Other states, 
such as the UK or US, that have a record of not negotiating with armed groups, often 
attempt to rescue their citizens with typically unsuccessful tragic results.210 In 2014 the 
United States deployed dozens of Navy SEALs in an effort to rescue American 
photojournalist Luke Somers held by AQAP in Yemen. Unfortunately, once the al-
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Qaeda fighters realized what was occurring they murdered Somers and his fellow 
captive, South African Pierre Korkie.211 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 Evidence indicates that domestic social issues, such as crime, corruption, and 
weak economic conditions are associated with elevated rates of kidnap for ransom. 
However, there is an even greater positive relationship between economic growth and 
violent crime. Additionally, violent crime of one variety, e.g. armed robbery, is 
associated with increased levels of other violent crime as well. Pires, Guerette, and 
Shariati concluded economic, political, security, and social variables contribute to a high 
level of KfR in states they observed. 
 Adherence to an ideology can be a powerful driving force for some members of 
armed groups; however, others motivated by the chance for financial gain or elevated 
stature in a community. Ideology has a way of setting boundaries of acceptable 
behavioral for a group. It is the lens by which an organization understands the world 
around it as well as history and outsiders. The recognition that their beliefs are radical is 
not lost, and even embraced, by true believers of radical ideologies. An important use of 
ideology is how it is used by some to label other people and objects into representative 
symbols. Guilt deflection is a use of ideology to blame a victim or otherwise excuse 
one’s own actions that are normally considered socially unacceptable.  
 
211. Kareem Fahim and Eric Schmitt, “Two Hostages Killed in Yemen As U.S. 
Rescue Effort Fails,” New York Times (New York City, NY) Dec. 6, 2014. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/world/middleeast/hostage-luke-somers-is-killed-in-




 In the context of terrorism studies, strategy is the method by which a group, or 
single actor, intends to achieve stated goals. Any such strategy will use violence and 
should be commiserate with the organization’s, or individual’s, ideology. Tactical 
planning for an attack may be conceptualized as lying upon a horizontal axis with one 
direction representing symbolic and the opposite direction representing practical—in 
reality, a terrorist attack with lie somewhere between these two extremes. Some attacks 
have a primarily symbolic purpose to shock and surprise while others will have a more 
direct purpose to injure and maim a target. An example of a popular strategy was 
inspired by the Chinese revolutionary Mao Tse-tung and adopted by the left-wing 
Peruvian group Shining Path in their struggle against that country’s central government. 
 A major impediment to a successful terrorist campaign is target protection—a 
real life game of cat and mouse. Targets may be either mobile, as in a person or train, 
or immobile, such as with a place of worship or government facility. During transit is an 
optimal time to attack a mobile target because security forces cannot fully restrict others 
whom are also on the same or adjacent street as the target under protection. If 
insurgents are planning to attack a mobile target it is essential for them to know when 
and where their target is located. One important method by which targets are protected 
is by limiting the amount of public information about their whereabouts available so that 
information is not used to plan an attack. In addition to limiting the amount of information 
about a target’s location and movements, when protecting a mobile target, it is also 
useful to alternate regular movements and change vehicles in order not to establish 
regular patterns. Against a strong defense, plotters have three options: to abort the 




assault by other means is decided, success may be achieved by employing 
overwhelming forces or circumventing defenses. If a decision is made to attack a 












Kidnap for ransom (KfR) in Colombia and Afghanistan is a common phenomenon 
in areas of conflict. Civil servants, soldiers, foreign nationals, and soldiers are regularly 
targeted because they are all valuable either in exchange for imprisoned compatriots or 
money. In particular, bureaucrats, politicians, and police or military members hold great 
symbolic value to their government and thereby to the captors of the kidnapped.                                        
One notorious case in Afghanistan included 23 South Korean missionaries abducted 
from their bus in Ghazni Province in 2007. Two men were murdered and the remnant 
were released six weeks later reportedly in exchange for US$20 million and the 
withdraw of all 200 non-combat Korean troops in Afghanistan by end of year 2007. This 
last point illustrates the difficulty in separating KfR from kidnap for political gains. 
Despite some well-known KfR cases in Afghanistan and Colombia little academic work 
exists on the subject from the perspective of kidnappers. For the FARC and Taliban 
income generated by KfR pales in comparison to what either organization made from 
their respective drug trades. Furthermore, in the case studies of the Taliban and the 
FARC while KfR has been a reliable source of income and when economic motivated 
kidnappings do occur in Afghanistan and Colombia the change to the Taliban and the 
FARC’s organizational behavior has proved imperceptible to decipher between the two 




Thomas Howes, Marc Gonsalves, and Keith Stansell were the three Americans 
private military contractors held concurrently with Senator Íngrid Betancourt in the 
former demilitarized zone in south central Colombia. Their account, Out of Captivity, 
jointly authored by the three men with Gary Brozek describes how they and their fellow 
captives were kept by the FARC in steel cages or chained to trees. FARC guerrillas 
kept the group of captives moving so as to avoid detection from the American and 
Colombian CT authorities. In the case of the kidnapped South Koreans, they were 
shuffled between farmhouse and cellars oftentimes in small groups of three and four 
during their six weeks captivity. What these cases illustrate is that the capture and 
imprisonment of both groups was opportunistic and improvised. There were no specific 
arrangements made by the FARC or Taliban for keeping captives in their territory.  
After introducing relevant but limited historical material on the FARC and the 
Taliban, this chapter examines available KfR data and notable cases of the two groups. 
Unfortunately, it is clear that neither group adopted a perceptible organizational change 
from KfR and that the tactic itself corresponds to a small fraction of both groups’ overall 
activity. Therefore it is reasonable to look somewhere else to determine if organizational 
development actually did result from similar illicit activities. The Taliban and the FARC 
make tremendous money from the opium and cocaine trades respectively. Numerous 
amounts of literature document the overall trades and how both groups participate in it 
to great benefit. Narco-trafficking is not strictly terrorism by the Hoffman definition used 
earlier in this study because (1) narco-trafficking is not inherently political nor (2) 
designed to have a far-reaching psychological impact beyond the immediate deed. 




is, at least in the case of the FARC and Taliban; done by non-state actors; and both 
organizations poses an identifiable chain of command, are un-uniformed, and do have 
organizational structure. With this in mind, and in order to test this work’s hypothesis, it 
is reasonable to study the organizational changes from narco-trafficking on the FARC 
and the Taliban. After an examination of both groups’ narco-trafficking activities an 
analysis of the kidnapping and drug trafficking behaviors will commence.              
 
4.2 Colombian State Weaknesses in the 20th Century 
At the height of the insurgency at the end of 20th century the violence and 
instability in Colombia was staggering. Warfare, crime, and internal migration affected 
tens of thousands of people whose lives were disrupted. Nearly 40,000 politically 
motivated murders were committed between 1990 and 2001 with a staggering 25,660 
from all kinds of murders in the year 2000 alone.212  More than 5,400 civilian non-
combatants perished in 2001 as a result of the civil war, which represents approximately 
a 350 percent increase over 1998.213 Between January 1995 and January 2001 7,748 
reported kidnappings took place in Colombia, however; this number likely undercounts 
the actual number of kidnappings as most go unreported to authorities.214  
In economic terms the litany of crime and warfare resulted in the most severe 
economic depression ever to strike the country with unemployment hitting above 20 
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percent during 2000-2001.215 an estimated 2,858,000 Colombians were unemployed in 
July 2001. In 1999 industrial capacity fell 17 percent. From 1993 to 1999, foreign 
investment plummeted 70 percent as firms fled for a lack of security and shrinking local 
market.216 In concert with an IMF restructuring and loan package in 2000, the 
Colombian government raised taxes, increased privatization, slashed funding on social 
welfare programs, while increasing military spending precipitously.217 Two years later in 
2002 roughly 40 percent of government revenue went towards repaying foreign loans; 
thus, a substantial share of public spending was not directed to social services, which 
put an even greater strain on the peoples’ lives. This profound depression came as a 
shock to Colombians who thought they had been immune to the debt woes of Latin 
America of the 1980s and 1990s during which time the Colombian economy was 
thrived. Worsening the long-term economic and social situation was the increasing 
wealth inequality in historically one of the most unequal states in the region. For 
instance, the Colombian Gini coefficient jumped from 0.55 in 1991 to 0.59 in 1999.218 
These were the conditions of the nation during the FARC’s greatest strength.  
The origins of the most successive militant group in the western hemisphere lie in 
La Violencia. La Violencia was a transformative period in Colombian history that 
accelerated economic and social trends began during the peace of the early 20th 
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century despite the bloodshed. In addition to greater economic development and global 
trade increased domestic politics became more widely secular that had been a 
longstanding cleavage between left and right for 150 years.219 A new political rivalry was 
created at the cessation of hostilities as the Liberal-Conservative divide was replaced by 
a new power-sharing agreement known as the National Front. Nevertheless, new more 
radical leftist groups splintered from the Liberals. Newer leftist groups were excluded 
from acceptable mainstream politics so then they rebelled against successive National 
Front governments. In this fasion domestic politics fit into the wider Cold War struggle. 
By the mid 1990s the FARC had reached its zenith of power. It was one of the 
strongest and wealthiest insurgent groups in the world. Its roots can be traced to a 
radical liberal faction from the time of La Violencia. At this time the FARC’s longtime 
leader Manuel Marulanda Vélez “Sureshot” (birth name Pedro Antonio Marín) was a 
rising star in leftist guerilla circles of the 1950s. What would become the nucleus of the 
FARC shared a goal of defending peasants it was sympathetic to from government 
violence.220 The FARC has its roots in the peasant groups that organized the armed 
defense of their land. This social component of the FARC undoubtedly means a strong 
ascendant of the peasant culture within the organization.221 Indeed, 90 percent of FARC 
member are villagers of indigenous descent and the remainder are middle class 
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urbanites.222 In this way the composition of the FARC is unique among leftist guerilla 
groups. Most notable of long desired reforms were land reform, but radicals also wanted 
strategic resources nationalized and an end to foreign economic involvement in their 
country by Americans and Europeans. The ideology of Marulanda’s group was heavily 
influenced by the popularity of communist thought in the developing world and they 
were also inspired by the recent Chinese Revolution. 
As of their second conference, the FARC has a bylaw that defines its 
organizational structure, which has been complemented and updated in the following 
conferences. The overall body has a hierarchical structure made up of the following: 
central staff commander, block commander, front commander, column commander, 
company commander, guerilla commander, and squad commander. A political cell 
works from the basic unit of the organization which is the squad, made up of 12 
members. All member of FARC from this unit to the main central state form a part of a 
cell. Training of new recruits is of a political-military nature, i.e. guerrillas and 
commanders are required to have both skill-sets and perform both roles as a political 
and military leader. In practice, however, this has not been the case due to the 
dynamics of war have required the military considerations to outweigh political ones.223 
Over time, leadership has had to reshape elements of the group in response to learned 
lessons and changes to society. 
FARC claimed to be the guerilla organization that has the largest number of 
women and their presence has been visible since its foundation. Starting in 1985, 
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women began to form part of the organization as guerillas.224 This level of inclusion was 
fought for by female members who had previously been sidelined to domestic service 
positions. In addition to women’s expanded combat role they also contributed in 
communications and IT positions and on average they were more highly educated.225  
However, females were still forbidden to have relationships with men not in the 
organization—a rule that does not apply to their male comrades. As well as being more 
female than many armed groups, it is a young persons’ organization: most of the 
combat commanders at the front level are young people of 20, 22, or 25 years.226 This 
guerilla organization recognizes that it has children of under 15 in its ranks too. 
According to FARC, in most cases they are orphaned children or victims of violent 
actions.227 
There is much speculation when it comes to the amount of money FARC 
handled, about how they obtain resources to finance the organization, about how they 
manage their assets and invest money. According to Jesús Antonio Bejarano, “The 
reality is that we have an ambiguous idea of the guerilla’s finances and their real 
magnitudes. Everybody speculates about how much comes from a kidnapping, how 
much for drug trafficking, or extortion, but these are only estimates”. Semana Magazine 
conducted a special report on FARC’s finances compiled from intelligence reports and 
interviews in which it concluded, amongst other findings, that the organization practices 
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money laundering widely.228 FARC has a solid financial position with an efficient 
administration at the central level that allows them freedom of action without having to 
depend on international aid for their operations. The centralization of finances in FARC 
has two main advantages: on the one hand, the concentration of income facilitates the 
control, investment, the more equitable management of resources, and the proportion of 
a common budget as a whole, in accordance with the needs of its members and the 
expense of its operations. When Law 002, a policy the FARC termed a war tax, was 
promulgated segments of Colombian society as diverse as the church, media, and 
private industry were concerned about how the “tax” may implicate them in funding 
FARC. FARC’s relationship with illicit crops and the drug trafficking economy is a 
dynamic process that has had different stages.  
 
4.3 FARC Enters the Cocaine Trade    
Prior to the mid 1980s, FARC was nearly a different group from before that point. 
Before this time, it was a weak leftist militant group until their transition into the coca 
industry developed it into a vigorous rebel movement. This is partly due to the wilting of 
the Colombian state, but also a great deal of the group’s success should be attributed to 
its new found fortune from the narcotics industry, extortion of MNCs, and kidnap for 
ransom.229 The group’s strategic dominance in the southern provinces of Guaviare, 
Putumayo, and Caquetá allowed it to control chief areas of coca and poppy 
production.230 From 1998 to 2002 the government allowed the FARC to operate freely in 
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the zona de distension, a territory approximately the size of Switzerland, as part of a 
broader lowering of hostilities to seek peace between the central government and 
FARC. However, by this point the FARC’s infrastructure and logistical network used for 
the drug trade had been established for an entire decade. In practice the declared 
cease fire provided FARC the space and safety to expand their power over rural villages 
and cocaine operations. Through the drug trade the FARC reinforced their traditional 
support for peasant farmers who have few economic opportunities for advancement 
outside of coca or poppy cultivation partially due to an ecosystem inhospitable to other 
crops.231 In return for their advocacy of peasants the FARC receives a portion of the 
profits from campesinos, peasant farmers. In response to the United States’ Plan 
Colombia, designed to substantially reduce the drug trade in Colombia, the FARC 
spoke out against aerial fumigation sorties designed to eradicate illicit drugs in the 
country. For an in-depth discussion on this policy see Vargas Meza’s 1999 book 
Fumigación y conflico: Politicas antidrogas y deslegitimación del estado en Colombia. 
Unfortunately, for the governments of Colombia and the US evidence suggests that the 
fumigation policy pushed campesinos deeper into the arms of their FARC protectors. 
Fumigation campaigns by the Colombian Army targeting marijuana, poppy, and 
coca began in 1978 and since the late 1990s have been assisted by the United States 
through its efforts to combat drug use. Such decades long efforts have not had the 
desired effect of curtailing production by large landowners or peasants and in fact the 
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social consequences of fumigation have been destabilizing to those who grow forbidden 
crops, according to many including Vargas Meza.232 In particular, with fumigation 
sorties, that utilized several chemicals over time, farmers who grew illegal crops were 
often forced deeper into rural, more mountainous areas to continue their work or moved 
to cities to pursue alternative jobs that often did not pay as well what could be made 
from growing cash crops.233 Also, in many cases poisons not only hit coca plants but 
also  vegetable gardens, yucca fields, livestock, and water sources of the locals. As 
many farmers of illicit crops live in areas under rebel control or contested lands, the 
destructive actions of the government pushed farmers loyalties away from the 
government to the rebels.        
The FARC’s ability to raise vast sums of money from narco-trafficking made them 
wealthy and financially independent so that they did not require support from the Soviet 
Union or Castro’s Cuba. This hallmark was unlike other leftist groups in Latin America 
that were disadvantaged by the end of the Cold War as large sources of their revenue 
disappeared from friendly state sponsors. From the 1990s thereon the FARC would rely 
upon more diverse sources of income of kidnappings, extorting MNCs that operated in 
FARC territory. “Tribute” demanded by the FARC from firms operating within their 
territory is a practice they formalized with the declaration of Law 002.234  This additional 
income stream raised new funds at a time when the FARC’s drug trade was attacked by 
a combination of the Colombian state and right-wing militias. Naming this 
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institutionalized extortion, a law gave an impression of legality such as would come from 
a genuine government.235 
The FARC’s relationship with narco-trafficking was historically complex. 
Generally, the components of the organization took a 10 percent tax in exchange for “ 
‘law’, order, and protection to populations involved in coca cultivation, chemical 
processing of raw coca into raw cocaine, as well as distribution.”236  This topic is too 
broad and complex to properly cover here, but we can provide a general understanding 
of FARC’s basic involvement in the industry. As narco-trafficking expanded in the 1980s 
so did too FARC’s military prowess and territorial influence. A former member recalled 
that by the mid 1980s the group-controlled Guaviare and Meta as well as the Serranía 
de San Lucas, Bota Caucana, Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta.237 These were all areas 
where previously the FARC had no presence. In addition to these areas, FARC quickly 
arrived in Choco, Bolivar, and the two Santanders.238  
Here, an important note about the scope of the FARC’s involvement in the drug 
trade is needed particularly as it compares to other narco-trafficking activities in 
Colombia at the same time because there are many inaccurate assumptions regarding 
FARC’s level of involvement in narcotics trafficking that deserve clarification. Firstly, 
only some members were involved in the narcotrafficking. Secondly, as was mentioned 
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above, those elements of the FARC that participated in the drug trade did so to initially 
to “protect and regulate” the industry.239 Additionally, by the mid 1980s cartels including 
Pablo Escobar’s began developing their own in-house security operations so that they 
would not need to sub-contract with the FARC. According to Rochlin, this change was 
primarily made for ideological reasons as the narco kingpins identified as leading 
capitalists of their country making their relationship with the socialist FARC uneasy. 
Since its inception the FARC vigorously demanded land reforms that would break-up 
the nation’s largest agricultural estates that by the 1980s were owned by narco-
traffickers in many cases. It was for this reason that the narcos financially supported the 
new paramilitaries developed in that decade to check the leftist ELN and FARC, but to 
also supplant their role as enforcers to for the narcos. 
To quantify the group’s dependence on different revenue sources is not simple 
because accounting illegal sources of income is difficult due to the fact that those 
numbers are secret and obviously not reported to either the Colombian government or 
an independent NGO. Also, revenue streams change over time as with a firm operating 
in a legal market. According to a 2003 study, 48 percent of the FARC’s budget was from 
the drug trade, 37 percent from extortion of businesses, nine percent from KfR, and six 
percent from cattle theft.240 Five years later, those figures increased to between 60 to 90 
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percent for drug related activities and 20 percent for kidnappings.241 Despite the group 
dedicating its members to the “in-house” work of kidnapping and extortion, FARC does 
not have vertical integration of its drug business. The specific degree of involvement in 
the production chain of cocaine depends on the particular FARC front, at which time, 
and which author is consulted. What there is a large degree of agreement upon is that 
FARC has “limited domestic drug activities and that the group relies on autonomous 
criminal organizations to distribute and traffic” of narcotics.242 Generally, the majority of 
FARC’s drug-related income derived from a tax to protect production and trafficking 
activities.243 
The centralization of finances in FARC distinguishes it from the militias and has 
two main advantages: On the one hand, the concentration of income facilitates the 
control, investment, the more equitable management of resources, and the proportion of 
a common budget as a whole, in accordance with the needs of its members and the 
expense of its operations. A fundamental difference between the how the cartels 
manage funds and how the FARC manages funds is that for FARC revenue gained by 
the drug trade is used reinvested while revenues of the cartels turn into profit. Finally, if 
this system of administration of its resources manages to meet the criteria of equity, 
solidarity, transparency, and efficiency, as expressed by its command.244 
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A 2007 UN World Drug report stated that while there is concern about 
international trafficking and trading drugs for arms, especially on account of the 
paramilitary Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), that work is mostly domestic and 
the bulk of the trafficking is done by a large number of small, professional cartels known 
as the “baby cartels”.245 The paramilitaries drug business was vertically integrated from 
crop production to distribution.246 In particular, the AUC acquired 30 percent of its 
revenue from protection payments of the landholding class and 70 percent from drug 
activities, though estimates of this net income varied widely from US$ 20 million to US$ 
200 million.247 It oversaw the growth, refinement, and international trafficking of its own 
product. Integration of the cocaine business within the AUC was more pronounced than 
it was for the FARC that traded protection for cash or arms with Colombian and other 
Latin American crime syndicates.248 
Stepping back for a moment form discussion on the FARC’s relationship to drug 
trafficking, how has the organization’s use of KfR developed since the mid 2000s and 
how does that contribute to the wider story? As part of President Uribe’s wider strategy 
to defeat the armed group, the Colombian military enjoyed widespread success in large 
battles and in targeted assassinations with financial support from the United States with 
its Plan Colombia. Uribe’s successor Juan Manuel Santos resurrected negotiations to 
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reach a lasting peace with the FARC in early 2012—peace talks had withered on the 
vine for a decade after the FARC commandeered a commercial airliner and kidnapped 
many passengers on board. As the two sides explored negotiations the FARC discretely 
announced it would end 35 years of financing their organization through KfR. More 
specifically, this language rescinded Law 002, which taxed or extorted those over a 
certain income; however, what that certain amount was is unclear even reaching middle 
income citizens. 
This declaration, according to Steven Dudley of InSight Crime, reflects the 
FARCs already decreased reliance on KfR as a once significant source of income.249 
Nevertheless, not all FARC fronts adhered to that policy that was aimed at softening the 
FARC’s image in the eyes of the Colombian public. In light of FARC’s already lowered 
number of kidnappings since the year 2000, as of the early 2010s, and the unpopularity 
of kidnappings, ending the practice was good politics for the organization and reflected 
a small concession to the peace process with little cost. Colombia’s GUALA, the 
nation’s national police, accused some FARC fronts of contracting with the ELN in KfR 
in addition to continuing the practice of “retentions” (the guerilla term for kidnapping) in 
their own right.250 This was occurring as the majority of members follow the rule of the 
Secretariat’s newer stance against kidnapping and as total number of cases continued 
to fall in the country.251 
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As the Colombian military won more confrontations with the FARC on their own 
turf in the countryside this decreased the group’s overall presence to smaller areas of 
control and precipitously decreased the number of guerillas by more than half over the 
decade from the early 2000s to the early 2010s. This change can be seen graphically 
above beginning in the year 2002 to 2003 when the decision was made to take back the 
demilitarized zone centered in the El Caguan region, which the FARC had used as a 
safe haven from the government.252 One effect this had was to deny the FARC land on 
which to detain hostages for extended periods of time—further limiting its ability to raise 
funds and continue its fight against the Colombian state. Additionally, from 2000 to 2012 
the demographics of the FARC’s Colombian kidnapping victims increasingly came from 
the middle and lower classes who can only afford to pay $5,000 on average, according 
to the government.253 If this estimate is accurate and if the government is correct in 
 
  





tabulating that the FARC commits 25% of all kidnappings in the country then the FARC 
would only bring in approximately $350,000 annually from KfR compared to a sum 
between $200-$600 million from drug trafficking activities. Therefore, it is easy to 
understand why the guerillas were willing to recent their unpopular “law”. Peace 
negotiations between the Santos administration and the FARC commenced and faltered 
several times from 2012 to 2015 culminating in a peace accord in 2016, yet some 
1,200-3,000 members are still active in fighting the state, according to InSight Crime.254 
 
4.4 Enter the “Narco-subs” 
There is possibly no more unique development from FARC’s relationship to 
drugs the past 30 years than the narco-subs. They represent a continuation of 
clandestine efforts to move cocaine out of Colombia through Central America to the 
United States besides other routes less well-worn than land routes. This innovation is 
an impressive accomplishment by a dark network’s ability to engineer a complex 
solution to maneuver around state control. According to Jaramillo, FARC’s narco-subs 
demonstrate: “1) relevant data on FARC’s ability to engage in a complex effort and 2) 
takes into account the organization limitations and constraints that may influence the 
technical capabilities and activities of the clandestine organization.” Narcotics-
submarines are “custom made, self-propelled maritime vessels” for the purpose of 
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smuggling drugs along the coast of Central America to points in the United States.255 
Early designs consisted of semi-submergible vessels built on speed boats hulls 
constructed in jungle clearings. Current designs feature GPS navigation and modern 
radar, fully submergible construction, and self-propulsion giving them capabilities of 
traveling long distances.256  
It became clear by the 1990s that air and sea smuggling routes no longer 
allowed the FARC to make large uninhibitedly shipments. Furthermore, land routes 
have always remained an arduous, lengthy option. Additionally, familiar methods of 
maneuvering around authorities through bribing or coercing border guards, concealing 
drugs in cargo containers, and use of underground tunnels became increasingly 
unpopular as experiments with narco-subs proved promising.257 For these reasons, 
narco-subs became an ever more popular mode of transporting large and expensive 
quantities of cocaine through the 2000s for a group not normally acknowledged as 
implanting the most modern technologies. Authorities are unaware of which or how 
many FARC fronts employ narco-subs. However, due to their high construction costs 
and degree of engineering expertise required to build narco-subs it is likely that 
coordination occurs between the central leadership and perhaps multiple operational 
units. Such a degree of coordination should make it easier to spread the costs 
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necessary for construction and transporting large quantities of drugs over the open 
sea.258 
FARC’s development of narco-subs represents an impressive long-term strategic 
effort to overcome significant obstacles to their trade that was vital to their ongoing war 
against the Colombian state. More impressive still is the subsequent innovations to the 
original submarine design and adoption of new communication, propulsion, and radar 
features. A former drug trafficker observed that, “Looking back, it appears that the 
Colombian cartel was honing their skills in preparation for their ultimate goal – the 
construction of a long-distance vessel that could dive and surface on command.”259 
Since the beginning of peace talks between the Colombian government and the 
guerrillas in 2016, there have been four stages of narco-sub development with each 
evolution building on the successes and avoiding the failures of the previous generation 
that ultimately lead to a fully submersible vessel.   
As it so happened, the steep up-front cost paled in comparison to the enormous 
expected revenue made from a single shipment of cocaine.260 Ramirez estimates that it 
costs less than $2 million to build a vessel capable of carrying eight tones of drugs and 
that one shipment will fetch over $200 million in revenue.261 As the subs notoriety grew 
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there have been reports of the FARC selling narco-subs or their plans to friendly dark 
networks that diversified the FARC’s income streams and adds to greater revenue.262 
This development illustrates practically how technologies spread from one armed group 
to another. 
Jaramillo continues that FARC found success for four primary reasons: Firstly, as 
it has been noted several times earlier, the FARC committed considerable financial and 
human resources into the narco-sub project on which they placed great hopes. Not only 
were such resources marshaled to construct prototypes but this continued for a period 
of over two decades. Secondly, the FARC exercised a great deal of influence in the 
areas of the country they occupied, so much so, that locals in adjacent villages feared 
speaking to authorities about the secretive construction nearby.263 In this manner, plans 
were executed more smoothly under clandestine conditions. For instance, in 2008 a 
submarine was seized containing four naval engineers who all claimed they had been 
kidnapped and coerced into building narco-submarines.264 Thirdly, the FARC under the 
Joint Western Command, based around the Pacific coast, was able to conceal 
construction of their boats from authorities. Clandestine work and intimidation enabled 
them to continue building without disruption from locals. Fourthly, as mentioned before, 
the FARC exhibited an extraordinary capacity in the group’s learning individually and 
corporately. 
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4.5 Taliban Origins 
It was the hope of many Afghans that a movement of Islamic students would 
bring peace and order to their country that was in such chaos after the previous 
communist regime had been overthrown by the mujahedeen in April 1992.265 
Afghanistan in the early 1990s before the Taliban’s consolidation of control was a state 
teetering on the edge of collapse. Mujahedeen warlords fought for independence from 
the Soviet Union during the 1980s were widely seen as corrupt and their factionalism 
severely weakened the country. Before the Taliban rose to power a patchwork of allied 
warlords ruled the country who frequently switched sides, fought their own former 
comrades and then switched sides again. In the northeast and east President 
Burhanuddin Rabbani controlled the mainly ethnic Tajik provinces centered around the 
capital Kabul. The three most west-ward provinces centered around the city of Herat 
were controlled by Ismael Khan. In the south near the Pakistan border three provinces 
were controlled by a shura (council) of mujahideen located at Jalalabad. Finally, a small 
area to the southeast of Kabul was controlled by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. In the north, 
Uzbek General Rashid Dostum controlled six provinces and for a period of time was 
allied with the Rabbani government, but abandoned it to side with Hikmatyar. Southern 
Afghanistan near the Pakistani border centered around Kandahar was controlled by 
“dozens of petty ex-mujahideen warlords” which plundered the local population 
willingly.266      
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The origins of the Taliban come from the southern Afghan city of Kandahar in 
1994 as a small group of madrassa students turned vigilantes during a lawless post-war 
time in that country. Their leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, was a hitherto 
unimpressive man from the obscure village Nodeh outside Kandahar born 
approximately in 1959. From a humble family, Omar’s parents were landless peasants 
of the Hotak tribe of the Ghilzai branch of Pashtuns.267 During the course of the war with 
the Soviet Union Omar’s family moved to Tarinkot in Urozgan Province to escape the 
conflict. Urozgan is one of the most remote regions of Afghanistan, so few Soviets ever 
entered that province. From 1989 to 1992 Omar fought for Hizb-e-Islami against the 
Soviet supported Najibullah regime and was wounded four times including one that 
famously took his left eye.  
The Taliban’s original members were composed of Mullah Omar’s madrassa 
students who grew up during the chaotic period of war with the Soviet Union and 
subsequent government collapse afterwards in the early 1990s. Multiple origin stories 
surround the beginning of the Taliban in Kandahar. They all express the same idea that 
Omar and his talabs, as some sources refer to early followers, brought justice to lawless 
Kandahar by punishing sinful men. Many pupils grew up living in refugee camps in 
Pakistan outside the traditional Afghan communities that taught and supported native to 
traditions and customs. Omar himself had little formal religious education; nevertheless, 
he opened a school for teenage pupils. As the Taliban’s fame grew their prestige 
increased in the eyes of the locals because the student fighters did not ask for any 
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monetary rewards, but only help from local communities in making a better Islamic 
society.    
The men who joined Omar’s movement were children of the jihad who were 
disaffected with old mujahideen leaders whom allowed crime and disorder to run 
rampant throughout the land. In the opinion of many in the younger generation their 
leaders failed because they had fallen into corruption and excess; consequently, they 
fell short of the goal of implementing an authentic Afghan Islamic society. Those 
mujahideen dissatisfied with the status quo understood themselves as continuing the 
jihad that cleared Afghanistan of the invasion of communism and the Red Army.268 In 
Pakistani madrassas (religious school) pupils studied what life would look like in an 
ideal Islamic society prescribed by the Prophet Mohammed 1,400 years ago. This is the 
society the Taliban deeply desire to imitate. Based on these difficult life experiences and 
the political discussions around what should be done to help the state of their country 
an agenda developed: restore peace, disarm the population, enforce sharia, and 
maintain the Islamic character of Afghanistan.”269  
The Taliban has relied on several key religious texts in addition to the Quran and 
Islamic history for inspiration for the movement and guidance for administration and 
jurisprudence. Islamic Justice teaches on these points as well as how to promote good 
and punish evil in the population.270 A later text, Shariat Teaching on Jihad, draws on 
similar literature as Islamic Justice to instruct readers on how to distribute loot and when 
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to make and break ceasefires.271 Obedience to the Amir is another influential paper by 
Pakistani scholar Mufti Rasheed Ahmed is the main source for guidance for the 
Taliban’s internal affairs particularly in terms of the relationship between mujahid and 
amir.272 Mufti Rasheed Ahmad toured the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and continued 
to act as a spiritual leader to the Taliban’s leadership even after the group lost control of 
the country. 
Obedience to the Amir is both a practical handbook on how the Taliban 
movement should be run and also a heroic origin story of how the group’s leaders came 
to implementing sharia in Afghanistan against imperialist forces. The term amir to Mufti 
Ahmad refers to the Amir ul Momineen (at that time Mullah Omar) as well as the 
broader leadership of the organization for who the mujahideen owed their allegiance. 
Such submission to authority and unity within the group is right because the amir is 
appointed by God so he can be trusted to make decisions that may be understood by 
lower ranking members whom do not have divinely revealed knowledge of the supreme 
leader. One’s obedience to leadership and cohesiveness within the group is akin to 
remaining in the fold of Islam, according to Rashhed Ahmad. The organizational 
structure advanced by the author was hierarchical and simple. All members owed their 
allegiance to an amir who sat in a college of equals that report to an amir ul momineen. 
In addition to this leadership apparatus, the shura council should play a purely advisory 
role to the amir who has full authority in making decisions for the group 
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Mufti Rasheed Ahmad also contributed to the development of Taliban internal 
affairs by developing Islamic thinking around organizational design. For instance, he 
advocated for the regular rotation of civilian administrative personnel among military 
fronts in order to continually imbue those not in combat roles from with a fighting spirit 
and to prevent distance from growing between the back office and the front-lines.273 The 
significance for rapid overturn in service of office workers was to retain the sense of 
urgency of jihad to those members. Closely related to the above idea is Mufti Ahmad’s 
notion of the benefits of the Taliban’s spartan lifestyle so as not to make any one 
position too comfortable, desirable, or to fuel flames of ambition of any Taliban. This 
egalitarianism stood in stark contrast to Afghanistan’s rich palace court culture in 
imitation of the Turkish sultan’s splendor and also in contrast to the corruption and 
lavish lifestyles of mujahideen leaders of the 1980s and 1990s. So it was that partially 
through the influence of the spiritual leader Rasheed Ahmad that the leadership of 
Taliban amirs, who are poorly educated religious men, adopted his ideas to their 
organization of unity, hierarchy, service, and austerity. 
The composition and especially the demographics of the Taliban have little 
changed since their beginnings through nearly the present.274 These men who make up 
the highest levels of the Taliban leadership mostly came of age in Pakistan be educated 
in madrassas of the Deobandi variety although not really progressing far in that pursuit 
and they were motivated to action by a zeal to implement a fairer, more just, virtuously 
Islamic society in their homeland. However, lower-level commanders not at the national 
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level are still a majority of Pashtun ethnicity but not of the Kandahar Province; so, at the 
middle and lower levels of Taliban leadership there is a greater emphasis on 
representing the local populace.275 
As it has been mentioned above, today the highest two levels of Taliban 
leadership are men who were mostly active in the movement during the days of the 
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996-2001) who were also early arrivals to Mullah 
Omar’s Kandahar City-based movement. Insomuch as the organization is described as 
a movement of mullahs. It is because of this set of leaders. In Afghanistan, the term 
mullah is a general title referring to one who has had some indeterminate amount of 
religious education. Actually, based on a study of Afghan Taliban leadership those not 
comprising the senior most positions are more highly educated than the core 
leadership. That is, the mawlvi or qualified cleric and even more senior judges who are 
part of the ulema are under the direction of those who are essentially madrassa drop-
outs.276 At the level of walis (provincial governor), or more accurately in most cases 
shadow governor, these men have a less developed background in the madrassas but 
what is prized most for selecting these commanders is their loyalty to the cause and 
ability their as military leaders.277 This information is difficult to come by, particularly as 
the Taliban has the habit of rotating mid-level leadership throughout the country, yet 
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much of the evidence regarding the Taliban’s human resources was provided to Michael 
Semper by two former Taliban leaders turned informants.278                        
Afghanistan’s infamous opium industry has its origins in the Pakistani drug trade 
of the 1980s, which was introduced to Afghanistan by the war with the Soviet Union. At 
that time Pakistan was producing 800 metric tons of opium annually that accounted for 
an astounding 70 percent of global supply until 1989.279 Over that decade a corrupt 
system developed, which intersected global politics, regional security, and a 
multinational drug trafficking business. The truck, donkey, and camel caravans that 
transported CIA purchased weapons into Afghanistan from Pakistan carried away 
heroin to Karachi’s port for worldwide export. Cultivation of poppy and its production into 
opium and heroin crisscrossed the same routes controlled by Pashtun tribes that were 
paid-off to allow arms moved through their lands.280 Remarkably, both the mujahideen 
and communist officers in the Afghan military participated and profited in this early stage 
of the drug trade. It would be impossible for the governments in Kabul, Islamabad, 
Moscow, and Washington D.C. not to know about the burgeoning narcotics industry in 
Pakistan, but at that time drugs were an acceptable negative externality of the greater 
civil war in Afghanistan. 
From 1992 to 1995, Afghanistan produced between 2,200 and 2,400 metric tons 
of heroin annually; an amount that rivaled Burma as the largest producer worldwide.281 
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According to the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) Kandahar Province 
produced 120 metric tons in 1996 on 3.160 hectares of poppy compared to the previous 
year’s 79 metric tons from 2,460 hectares. Following this in 1997 as Taliban control 
extended farther north past Kabul, opium output rose to 2,800 metric tons, an increase 
of 25 percent. As tens of thousands of refugees returned from Pakistan, they took-up 
poppy farming as it was the “easiest and most lucrative cash crop available.”282 
However, the extraordinary amount of heroin produced in country did not lead to 
financial freedom for poppy farmers. Only an estimated 1 percent of total profits were 
kept by farmers with the overwhelming majority going to European and North American 
narcotics dealers.283 Tax receipts are estimated to have been US$ 20 million for the 
Taliban with an unknown, probably greater amount, collected as bribes.284  
The Taliban quickly realized the importance and potential poppy cultivation had 
in the economy after they captured Kandahar. Initially, they outlawed the use and 
production of all drugs, which led optimistic American diplomats to quickly attempt to 
establish lines of communication with the nascent conquers for the purpose of 
eliminating large scale poppy growth. Throughout the 1980s, mujahideen warlords 
profited as an open secret from the drug trade to fund their armies and line their 
pockets. They purchased expensive villas in Peshawar and kept foreign bank accounts. 
In public, commanders would admonish one another for indulging in the dirty drug trade.  
Within a few months Mullah Oman and the Taliban recognized the value of poppy and 
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how its illegality angered local farmers.285 From that point forward, the Taliban 
participated more heavily in the drug trade than any mujahideen before them.  
The Taliban were able to develop a purely Islamic reason for farmers to grow 
opium despite the Quran forbidding production and consumption of intoxicants. Abdul 
Rashid, the leader of Kandahar’s anti-drug task force, explained the duty of his post to 
enforce the law forbidding hashish, “because it is consumed by Afghans and 
Muslims.”286 Nevertheless, “opium is permissible because it is consumed by kefirs 
(unbelievers) in the West and not by Muslims or Afghans.”287 Furthermore, he 
continued, “We let people cultivate poppy because farmers get good prices. We cannot 
push the people to grow wheat as there would be an uprising against the Taliban if we 
forced them to stop poppy cultivation. So, we grow opium and get our wheat from 
Pakistan.”288  
Taxes from the opium trade with Afghanistan’s neighbors contributed 
handsomely to the Taliban’s treasury during their government – reportedly a box 
beneath Mullah Omar’s bed. In 1995 the UNDCP estimated revenue from the Afghan 
drug trade totaled US$1.35 billion.289 By 1998 revenue had more than doubled to US$3 
billion.290 Drug money was critical for filling the voracious appetite for weapons, 
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materiel, and recruits for the war between the Taliban and its various internal 
adversaries, most notable of which was the Northern Alliance commanded by Ahmed 
Shah Massoud. In addition to the lucrative drug trade, smuggling sophisticated routes 
stretching from Central Asia to the Gulf remains a major economic sector in the country 
and profitable source for taxes. Despite the vast amount of money acquired over this 
period the Taliban leadership continued to live as ascetics. Their lifestyle was in stark 
contrast to the lavish lifestyles enjoyed by many other warlords of the civil war period. 
Additionally, the drug smugglers themselves became enormously wealthy from the 
Afghan narcotic trade.  
Some Taliban leaders did attempt to grow local industries and foreign investment 
besides the existing war-time trades. “We want to develop Afghanistan as a modern 
state and we have enormous mineral, oil, and gas resources which should interest 
foreign investors”, said Mullah Ahmed Jan, Minister of Mines and Industries, a Saudi 
who left his carpet business to join the Taliban.291 He added that, “Before we took 
control of the south there was no factory working in the country. Now we have reopened 
mines and carpet factories with the help of the Pakistani and Afghan traders.”  However, 
there was never serious interest from the organization’s heads in the powerful Kandahar 
Shura.292 Jan concluded that the shura had little time for economic issues as they were 
too interested in the war.  
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4.6 The Opium Trade Surges 
The Taliban after 2001 was given an open door to reemerge due to three critical 
shortfalls of: Afghans’ displeasure with the Karzai government, security shortfalls made 
by the US and ISAF, and modification of Taliban ideology to a more nationalist and 
moderate stance on social issues.293 With continued lack of economic development 
southern and eastern regions remained reliant on the drug trade that was once again 
prohibited by the American supported central government. This decision predictably 
angered local farmers who were formally forbidden from growing their most profitable 
crop in the country. Naturally, the Taliban took advantage of this situation by 
encouraging the drug trade that benefited local farmers, once again contributing 
handsomely to the organization’s treasury and regaining support as an alternative to the 
new Karzai government amongst a large segment of the population. In the early 2000s 
the Taliban were able to regroup as NATO forces were insufficient to occupy a country 
the size of France as part of the “light footprint” distribution of Western military 
presence. With a shortage of foreign forces to enforce peace, the Taliban were able to 
make the case to local communities that they were the ones to restore justice to lawless 
areas as they had done before in the mid 1990s.294 In response to the new political and 
military dynamics in Afghanistan, the Taliban changed their messaging from 
conservative zealots to God-fearing nationalists intent on expelling foreign invaders, not 
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unlike the mujahideen of yester yore.295 In this narrative the Karzai government is a 
patsie of the Westerns whom are undermining traditional Afghan society.  
 The kidnapping of foreigners and Afghans is common across the country by the 
Taliban or criminal gangs. Ransom demands by the Taliban usually fit into some 
combination of three spaces for money, the release of Taliban prisoners by the 
government or United States, or as a reprisal for cooperation with the Afghan 
government or Americans. Of the foreigners who are abducted they tend to come from, 
engineers, aid workers, or military contractors working in the country. Afghan hostages 
are typically local government officials or civilians and in these cases ransom demands 
are commonly made to the national government because most Afghans do not have the 
means to pay ransoms. A notable hostage case that made international headlines was 
that of the Korean missionaries who were abducted in 19 July 2007 while the group of 
23 were en route through disputed territory in Ghazni Province. Two men were killed 
within the beginning weeks and two women were set free to the International Red Cross 
for the purpose of building goodwill with the Korean government. A month earlier, two 
German engineers were captured with one having been killed. A Taliban spokesman, 
Qari Yousef Ahmadi, demanded 21 of his compatriots be released for the freedom of 
the 19 remaining Koreans—a demand that several members of the Afghan rejected 
outright.296 “Our position is the same: We are not releasing [any Taliban]”, said Ghazni 
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Governor Marajudin Pathan.297 It was reported, but not confirmed by the South Korean 
government, that the hostages were released in return for USD$20 million. 
 A remarkable kidnapping of 70 villagers occurred in southern Kandahar Province 
for reportedly cooperating with the authorities. Seven were killed and another 30 were 
then released, according to Abdul Raziq, the head of the Kandahar Province Police.298 
This occurred in the context of generally higher civilian casualties even for Afghanistan 
since the rise of the Islamic State Khorasan Province in 2015. A report from the United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 1,662 civilians died in the first six months of 
2017, and 3,581 were injured.299 Many mass kidnappings have occurred in 2016 
through 2019, especially along the country’s many desolate motorways, after the 
majority of the security responsibility came to ANSF from ISAF. Indeed, at the end of 
2019 27 peace activists from a group called People’s Peace Movement were abducted 
while traveling between Farah and Herat provinces. The Taliban earlier accused the 
new group of being financially supported by the Kabul government and therefore pawns 
or in league with foreigners.          
During the Taliban’s resurgence their “level of dependence [on the drug 
economy] grew dramatically.” It had always been their largest source of income; greater 
so than gifts from foreign governments, human trafficking, or kidnap for ransom. Opium 
played a crucial role in reinvigorating the Taliban movement from near extension, and 
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transformed the insurgency across the Afghan-Pakistan border into something new.300 
Indeed, this dependence led to what is widely portrayed as the “New Taliban”. 
What is today known as the Taliban shares some of the organizational 
characteristics and political aspirations to their predecessors.301 “These are not the old 
Taliban. We don’t even know who they are anymore.”302 Mohammed Omar remained 
the titular head of the organization until his death in 2010 and he established a new 
shura in Quetta, Pakistan to replace the original council in Kandahar that had been 
scattered after the American invasion. The men of the new shura were more 
independent than those in the earlier shura because they were responsible for 
managing their own theatres of war, e.g. Jalaluddin Haqqani for the southeast and 
Mullah Dadullah for the south.303 The New Taliban is more fragmented both 
geographically and in terms of interests than its earlier iteration that engage in all kinds 
of activities from terrorism, racketeering, and kidnapping to smuggling. According to the 
same Afghan defense official, “We could round up the entire Quetta shura, and we 
would be no closer to ending the insurgency.” Nowadays, the Taliban can be seen 
destroying ancient Buddha statues in  northwest Pakistan, smuggling goods into Central 
Asia, or bombing a police station in Kabul.304 It is not uncommon for some individuals 
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who call themselves Taliban, or are referred to by locals, to communicate little with 
Taliban headquarters.305 They may have more to do with corrupt local officials and fight 
with other local insurgents who also claim to be Taliban. 
Evidence that drugs have altered the Taliban can be detected even at the fringes 
of the organization in the ideology of the Taliban. The Globe and Mail newspaper of 
Canada surveyed a small number of low-level Taliban soldiers and supporters finding 
that one-fifth of respondents grew poppy because their mullahs instructed them to do as 
such. 16 individuals responded that they hoped to make heroin addicts of non-Muslims. 
Said interviewee, Soldier 18, “It is obvious to everyone that the Americans hate poppies. 
And if we grow it…it will be better for us and worse for them.” This sentiment was made 
clear by Abdul Rashid in the 1990s. Soldier 19 said too, “Islam says not to grow it and 
we are not opposed to Islam, but our ulema (clerics) says to grow it because it is 
harmful to non-Muslims.”306 
Most consumer products are difficult to find in Afghanistan after decades of war. 
Taliban fighters often barter their service for food, weapons, motor bikes, and fuel. In an 
interview with al Jazeera journalist Qais Azimy, who traveled with Taliban fighters in 
Helmand Province, quoted one fighter as saying, “Everything we have is from opium.”307 
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According to the same source those soldiers also received a Toyota Corolla in which 
the men traveled. Traffickers and the Taliban form such a symbiotic relationship that the 
traffickers will cover larger expenses than even automobiles. High level traffickers will 
pay for the medical bills of injured Taliban, and at least one trafficker built a medical 
clinic in Quetta, Pakistan that provides care for injured solders.308 Other traffickers have 
built madrassas both in Afghanistan and Pakistan in part to recruit new members; 
others have built hotels in Pakistan for Taliban to rest and relax from their time on the 
battlefield. Though battlefield commanders are heavily reliant upon drug money, says 
an Afghan intelligence official, for daily expenses the senior leadership still requires 
“donations from rich Arabs in the Gulf and Pakistan.”309  
Afghanistan’s drug trade also makes strange competitors and customers of 
traditional allies and foes. The complex relationship between the Taliban and the 
Afghan government was alluded to in a UN report about drug corruption in the Karzai 
administration. It details 36 districts in poppy producing areas, or along smuggling 
routes, where an intricate series of kickbacks from police officers, to customs officers, to 
governors each enrich themselves.310 It continued to further explain how men with the 
choicest assignments stood to become wealthy from accepting bribes in their public 
positions and how those in lower positions were required to provide cuts of their own 
graft to superiors. Police officers stationed in lucrative areas were sometimes obligated 
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to pay as much as $40,000 a month to keep their jobs.311 This report pinpointed the 
man at the top of this corrupt public system was Ahmed Wali Karzai, the former 
president’s half-brother who was assassinated in 2011. Multiple US and NATO 
intelligence reports provide evidence the junior Karzai made drug deals via 
telephone.312 This information has been corroborated by western diplomats. As is 
common to other high-ranking government officials you won’t see Ahmed Wali Karzai 
actually touching the trade,” said a UN official who worked on the report.313 Finally, the 
UN official concluded, “He has influence over who gets what position — and that gives 
him extraordinary power.”  
Corrupt public officials and the Taliban do not negotiate face-to-face about drug 
smuggling. Conversely, the parties use smugglers as messengers to negotiate how 
much product will be moved and at what time and where. Saboo Agha, a poppy farmer 
in Gereshk, Helmand Province explained the operation as he regularly saw it:  
 
“The Taliban commander has the firepower and the drug dealer has the money. The 
opium gets transported in police vehicles, or other times I have seen them take the 
opium away in convoys with thirty or more armed men. You can see the government 
officials have secured the route for them, and next week the local police will have new 
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It is routine for local officials to receive bribes so drugs may move throughout 
Afghanistan. One deceptive tactic local police developed to raise cash through the drug 
trade is to “sell” districts they are assigned to protect from the local Taliban.315 “They’ll 
tell us that they lost control of the area because they are outgunned, but it will be a case 
where there aren’t more than ten Taliban in their region, and we have posted a hundred 
police to that district,” says a senior interior ministry official in Kabul.316 This situation is 
most noticeable, “Along the border, there’s an evil mix of government officials, district 
commissioners, and police chiefs who work with the Taliban,” says General Kamal 
Sadat, a former counter-narcotic police chief. He went on, “The government officials 
mostly just take the bribes. It’s the Taliban and the drug smugglers who actually move 
the drugs out.”317 
 In recent years poppy cultivation has grown to an incredible amount in the south 
of the country as local farmers have invested in solar arrays to boost the productivity of 
their farms. As early as 2013 farmers began acquiring the new technology to replace 
diesel powered water pumps that frequently broke and constituted the largest operating 
expense.318 Once the up-front cost of approximately USD$5,000 is used to purchase an 
array of panels, that largest cost is neutralized. In 2019, a British security firm, Alcis, 
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counted over 67,000 solar arrays in Helmand Valley alone, which does not include 
greater southwest Afghanistan where today an estimated two-thirds of total global 
supply of opium is grown.319 The potential for profit is having an effect of migration to 
the south provinces of the country into areas that were once desert. Before the price of 
opium crashed in 2018 from too much supply, Afghanistan produced a bumper crop of 
9,000 tones of the drug.320 There is no end in sight for the Taliban’s most profitable 
source of income. It remains to be seen how this will effect a well-funded armed group 
as all foreign troops are planned to leave the country next year.            
 
4.7 Analysis and Conclusion 
Both the FARC and the Taliban were or are prolific practitioners of KfR for 
decades. This is evidenced anecdotally and through data dating back now decades. 
Nevertheless, in terms of changes to the two groups’ organizational behavior this author 
could not locate anything significant in during research. What was discovered, and in 
keeping with the same theme of organizational behavior, was the extent to which the 
FARC and the Taliban joined in the drug trades in their countries. While KfR is 
profitable, especially when a hostage is foreign, it does not come close to the potential 
financial gain from narcotics. For those reasons it became necessary to include the 
implications of the narcotics trade in Afghanistan and Colombia while not forgetting the 
primary independent variable kidnap for ransom. How this chapter has accomplished 
that goal is by identifying trends and notable cases of the tactic but placing them in 
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context of the larger narrative of the FARC’s and the Taliban’s organizational 
development from the standpoint of violent activities.   
The most evident change to occur for the FARC and Taliban was the increase in 
human and materiel resources. For the Taliban this was the case whereby they 
attracted many young recruits whom had few other employment options besides fighter. 
As Rashid detailed, conventional means of employment and the traditional tribe were 
decimated by the Soviet-Afghan War, so a lifestyle of war-fighting was the most 
stabilizing element for many who grew up in refugee camps. FARC, after the Seventh 
Guerrilla Conference at the time the leadership decided to enter the drug trade the 
group formally added the initials EP to the end of its name, for Ejército del Pueblo or 
“People’s Army”. From this time forth they would identify themselves as the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army. Such a name change 
illustrated a change in tactics to a more aggressive stance whereby the FARC used its 
enlarged forces to openly attack the Colombian military in middle-size cites rather than 
only operating in rural villages.      
Cocaine had a profound effect on the capabilities of the FARC to fight the 
Colombian state and even the minor but unique case of narco-subs. Their development 
represents an ability to overcome many complex strategic, tactical, and technical 
obstacles crucial to maintain the FARC’s competitiveness in the cocaine trade. Success 
in this market was moreover central for the group to continue its decades long struggle 
against successive Colombian governments. Afghanistan’s terrain is some of the most 
challenging in the world containing dry, hot deserts and frigid mountains. Of course, it is 




heroin from Karachi to Gulf markets do use small ships. Nevertheless, the Taliban are 
not reported to use aircraft in transporting their opium product around Afghanistan—a 
country the size of France. Likely, this disuse of technical solutions to logistical and 
security problems is due to the high degree of complicity between the Taliban, trade 
cartels in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and local Afghan government bureaucrats. 
Additionally, it is probable that the Taliban’s power is more concentrated than that of the 
FARC’s; therefore, the Taliban could rely more on its brute strength than the FARC. 
Unofficial reports of the Taliban’s strength are currently 60,000 in a country half the size 
of Colombia when at the zenith of the FARC’s force in the late 1990s was estimated at 
17,000 guerillas.321  
Overall, the drug trade had the effect of making the Taliban less ideological than 
they had been before. This is one distinct difference between it and the FARC two after 
their conversion to narco-traffickers. Both organizations originated with a simple set of 
goals—namely, anti-imperialism and redistributive land reform for peasants in the case 
of the FARC and for the Taliban an end to anarchy around the city of Kandahar for the 
Taliban. After entering the drug trade that spread to Colombia in the early 1980s the 
FARC’s actions focused on leveraging their newfound wealth into winning territory from 
the government and protecting its presence in the cocaine trade, all the while generally 
assisting with agricultural development. Since the peace talks between FARC and the 
Santos government (2010-2018), the state has agreed to heavily invest in rural 
development and to allow the FARC to form into a new political party similar to the 
Union Patriótica of a generation earlier. Conversely, the Taliban in the minds of many 
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observers are nearly a different organization now than they were during the time of their 
government (1996-2001). It appears what has changed is that the Taliban is less 
socially conservative; although, this has mainly noticed around the more austere edges, 
demonstrated by it not enforcing previous edicts against sport, music, and television. 
What has remained is the same spirit of nationalism that is suspicious of foreign 
interference, but a much greater willingness to cooperate with Afghan security forces 
when there was money to be made from such an agreement. 
Over its more than fifty-year lifespan the FARC was one of the world’s most 
energetic insurgencies. They were deeply involved with countless acts of terrorism and 
criminality contributing to tens of thousands of casualties during their war against the 
Colombian government. Specifically, their identity was deeply intertwined with KfR and 
the cocaine industry, which despite the rebels’ disarmament, are two legacies that 
persist with other far-left guerillas groups and far-right paramilitaries in Colombia. 
Kidnap for ransom did not noticeably affect the FARC’s organizational behavior—unlike 
the cocaine trade. Participating in the cocaine industry significantly enlarged the FARC’s 
size and capabilities. One of the most inventive FARC achievements was the 
development of the narco-sub which effectively evaded the government and their allies 
to lucrative success. These successes translated into military victories against 
successive administrations from the 1980s to 2010s, but few political achievements. 
The 2016 peace accords negotiated in Havana and ultimately signed in November 2016 
have led to the overwhelming majority of FARC fighters to end their violent struggle yet 




The Taliban has been successful over the last quarter century in rising from an 
insignificant band of religious student fighters to an army and, for a brief time, a national 
government. Today, they continue to pose an ever-present danger existence of the 
Western supported Ghani government based in Kabul. Similarly, to the FARC, the 
Taliban has its fingers in many exploitative markets including: human trafficking, KfR, 
trade in opium, and clear-cutting forests for timber. During the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan (1996-2001) foreign assistance from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE 
also counted for a great deal of the emirates overall informal budget. If the Taliban had 
not yielded to Kandhari’s demand to allow the opium trade to remain open the Taliban 
may not have survived long after it seized the city. At various times the Taliban has 
taxed drug traffickers, outright owned poppy fields, and taxed farmers whom grow the 
lucrative cash crop. Opium is significant for the Taliban for what it allows the 
organization to attract a stream of recruits and pay off local provincial police officers, 
bureaucrats, and elected officials. Easy money is indeed such a power weapon for the 
Taliban that it has little need to adopt up-to-date technologies. Victory on the battlefield 
since 2007 has converted to political success for the Taliban who are in on-going peace 








Conclusion and Future Research 
 
“Kidnapping hostages is easy spoil, which I may describe as a profitable trade and a 
precious treasure.”322 




In March 2013 Italian aid worker Federico Motka received an assignment from 
his Geneva-based employer, Impact Initiatives, to examine refugee camps in northeast 
Syria for the purpose of conducting interviews for reports on camp management. Impact 
Initiatives also hired David Haines, a former British soldier, to provided security and 
logistics support to Motka during his assignment to Syria. While returning to their safe 
house one afternoon after visiting a camp, men with Kalashnikovs rushed their vehicle 
and taking the two men, but leaving their Syrian driver behind. Before they were shoved 
into an automobile trunk, Motka telephoned his boss to tell him that he and Haines were 
being kidnapped.  
 Over the course of the next year in captivity Haines and Motka were moved 
among several makeshift prisons with other hostages of differing European and 
American nationalities from farmhouses to an abandoned hospital, and so forth. The 
men and female hostage Kayla Mueller were eventually under the watch of British ISIS 
guards they called the Beatles owing to their London accents. During the course of their 
captivity, Motka’s and Haines’ treatment varied as they experienced torture, 
 
322.  Rukmini Callimachi, “Underwriting Jihad: Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls 






confinement to small rooms, denied access to toilets to having freedom to walk and 
enough food to eat near the end of their stay with the Beatles. Although their physical 
conditions varied at times, phycological abuse was near constant for the men and their 
companion hostages. In one instance, Russian hostage Sergey Gorbunov was shot in 
the head to be made an example of if ISIS ransom demands were unmet. 
 For all Haines and Motka had in common as hostages what separated them was 
their nations’ willingness or unwillingness to pay ransoms. Both men’s families met with 
their respective governments in London and Rome to discuss what would be done to 
bring them home. Haines family was told that the British government would do all it 
could to free him, but it would not pay his ransom. Federico Motka was release March 
2014 after one year in captivity while Haines was murdered in August 2014 along with 
the remaining Americans and British captives about six weeks after the last European 
hostage left.  
 How could these two men face drastically different outcomes despite having 
been kidnapped together by the same group in Syria at the same time? This chapter will 
focus on the topic of ransom payments to armed groups, or as they are more commonly 
referred to in the discourse of governments—‘terrorist’ organizations. It will explore the 
discussion around the pros and cons of paying ransoms from an ethical and pragmatic 
point of view in Section 5.2. Next will follow a review of the American, French, and 
Spanish response to demands for ransom payments in Section 5.3 because these three 
states represent distinct methods of approaching the dilemma, somewhat more reliable 
data exists for foreign hostages than non-Western ones. Furthermore, what this chapter 




targets in Chapter Three to the kidnapping business in two cases discussed in Chapter 
Four to Chapter Five’s examination of the public sector’s varied responses to 
kidnapping with particular focus on the most recent hotspot of the area occupied by the 
so-called Islamic State. What are the current trends in the research of kidnapping? Two 
of the most popular discourses are investigated below in Sections 5.2 and 5.3. In the 
last 20 years with the American wars in the Middle East and the rise and fall of ISIS a 
serious discussion regarding the permissibility of paying ransoms has emerged. This 
topic is closely related to another discussion of the effectiveness of states paying 
ransoms too. Lastly, section 5.4 will summarize and conclude the discussion of this 
thesis.  
 A no-concession policy is, as commonly understood, refers to a state’s public or 
even unstated position to not negotiate with armed groups over ransom demands. This 
position has been adopted by numerous countries that have experienced violence with 
terrorism throughout Europe, North America, and South America. It is popular with 
governments that want to appear strong and resilient in the face of a much smaller, less 
well-equipped adversary.             
Norwegian researcher Thomas Hegghammer analyzed 63 kidnappings that 
involved 159 hostages in Iraq during 2004. He discovered a case of “contagion” by 
which ‘terrorists’ copied the tactics of and learned from similar groups.323 Furthermore, 
Hegghammer notes, kidnapping is an efficient tactic because it uses fewer resources 
than other common modes of violence such as car bombs or suicide attacks. It is useful 
as a propaganda tool because demands from kidnappers may be recycled often during 
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negotiations and widely circulated in the media; although, with the use of the Internet a 
worldwide audience can be reached by circumventing old media too. Hostage 
negotiations can also be the launching pad for wider political negotiations or a way to 
material gain. 
A 2015 study by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point calculated 7,048 
kidnappings between 1970 and 2013 conducted by non-state actors, which includes 
“terrorists” as well as militants and pirates.324 There was an uptick in kidnappings 
beginning in 2001 by ideological jihadist groups mostly fueled by an increase in 
domestic kidnappings, e.g. Iraqis kidnapped by Iraqis or Nigerians kidnapped by 
Nigerians. From 2001 to July 2015 657 incidents of kidnappings of Westerners by 
jihadist groups, or approximately 45 annually.325 Despite the overall number of 
Westerners kidnaped constituting a small subset of the total, this subset is notable 
because of the impact negotiations of their release can have an outsized impact on 
global politics and raise significant financial support to transnational terror groups. 
Below, the graph illustrates the overall low number of foreigners taken in Colombia 
within the general upward trend during the decade from 1990-1999.326 Between 97 to 
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98 percent of kidnappings in Colombia were of native cattle ranchers, business 
executives, and local managers of MNCs.327 
 
 
5.2 Arguments in Support of and Against Paying Ransoms 
 Logically, a no concessions policy should deter kidnappings because 
unrewarded behavior would not be ‘rewarded’ by a refusal to pay. However, this logic is 
limited by the assumption that kidnappers are only seeking a financial reward for their 
efforts. Hoffman’s definition of terrorism used in this work specify that terrorism is 
“ineluctably political in its aims and motives”.328 So, with respect to KfR by an armed 
group its goal is foremost political and not financial as it might be for a criminal 
syndicate. Therefore, a no-concessions policy to armed groups would not be the best 
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deterrent for kidnappings. But there are also other conceptual reasons why a no-
concessions policy may not work as expected. 
  Firstly, kidnappers might not know about or understand the nuances of a state’s 
no-concessions policy.329 With 193 member states in the UN it is impossible for anyone 
to know the intricacies of each state’s ransom policy—that is, even if a state has 
coherent procedures for those situations. Secondly, kidnappers may not believe a 
government’s no-concession policy statement.330 Even if a nation does have a 
consistent record of not conceding to armed groups’ ransom demands, hostage takers 
may still expect payout from the victim’s family, company, or other private source. 
Thirdly, kidnappers may not care about a state’s ransom payment policy.331 Evidence 
supports that this is the primary reason no-concessions policies are not effective at 
deterring KfR.  
 A no-concessions policy as a means to deter KfR is probably the most cited 
reason for its adoption. The policy can also deter governments in a country where a 
kidnapping occurs from shirking their responsibilities to protect foreign nationals, legal 
residents, and diplomats inside their borders and leaving the responsibility to the 
hostage’s home government. This was the original reason for the American no-
concessions policy, according to Jenkins.332 
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 Another popularly cited reason for refusing to pay kidnappers’ ransoms is to deny 
‘terrorists’ money to commit future acts of terror. This goal quickly grew in importance 
after the attacks of 9/11 as the primary reason no-concession states such as the UK 
and US refuse to make payments. Efforts to build an international consensus against 
paying ransoms have primarily relied on this logic. “Refusing to pay ransoms to 
terrorists, therefore, not only makes it less likely that Americans will be taken hostage, 
but it also deprives terrorists of funding critical to their deadly aspirations and 
operations.”333 
 Arguments in support of ransom payments can be divided into the philosophical 
and the practical. The best reason to pay ransoms is that when they are paid hostages 
come home. Evidence to support this claim comes from Spain, which has brought home 
all 70 hostages taken by Somali pirates or Islamic fundamentalist groups.334 No other 
nation matches this record. Research conducted by the New America Foundation 
calculates that 81 percent of continental EU citizens are released by jihadist terror 
groups, compared to 33 percent of Britons and 25 percent of Americans.335 Many 
similar statistics of US/UK and continental European countries exist during the post-
2001 time period. 
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 What is to be made about the argument that those who pay ransoms are 
unwittingly financially supporting terrorism? After all, the organizations examined in the 
case studies of the last chapter have done much more harm to locals in their country 
than more financially ‘valuable’ Westerners. ISIS did innumerably more damage to 
Iraqis and Syrians than to Americans or Italians. According to the doctrine of double 
effect, agents that reluctantly financially support terrorism to save a life are less 
complicit than one who financially supports terrorism gladly.336 So while it is not good to 
financially support terrorism for the negative results that will likely occur to others in the 
future, it is not entirely ethically wrong to do so in order to save a life. 
 
5.3 Popular Models from States to Ransom Payment Demands 
In the past decade Spain designed a policy toward international kidnappings in 
response to the hijacking of a fishing boat, the Alakrana, in the Indian Ocean and the 
capture of three aid workers in North Africa by AQIM. This policy of negotiation and 
paying ransoms is one of the most liberal KfR polices around the globe with a success 
rate of 100 percent since 2009 – 70 in all.337 The goal is to safely recover Spanish 
citizens at all costs. In media requests on kidnappings in the last decade members of 
the center left Zapatero and center right Rajoy governments have ambiguously 
responded that “the government did what it had to do.”338 This statement is a way for 
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those politicians to take credit for the return of a hostage while not admitting directly 
funding terrorism. 
The Spanish media and public opinion are generally quiet with regards to foreign 
kidnappings of Spaniards. There are no civic protests with banners and slogans in the 
city squares or nightly newscasts chronicling the plight of victims. As the wife of a 
former hostage expressed this sentiment, there is no need to protest if we know the 
government is doing everything it can to bring our people home.339 The government 
requests that the media not report on hostage situations and this wish is honored by the 
country’s newspapers. Journalist José Maria Irujo, who writes for the national 
newspaper El Pais explained, “No newspapers have broken the pact, which has the 
support of everyone from the owners to the reporters. We could scoop each other, but 
what value does that have if you put someone’s life in danger?”340 Irujo went on to 
summarize the public’s sentiment in favor of paying ransoms as, “Spanish society is not 
prepared to accept that our citizens will die for a principle. The government will pay.”341  
In France there is a track record of public opinion harnessed in favor of returning 
hostages home that originated in the Lebanese hostage crisis. A uniqueness of France 
is that when international kidnappings occur, they are seen as “une affaire d’état”, not 
simply as an attack on an individual, but as an assault on country.342 A feature of 
political culture in France is that the government is understood to protect and provide for 
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the welfare of its citizens. When a Frenchman or woman is kidnapped the president is 
empowered to take proactive stance in retrieving the victim by force or ransom 
payment. In fact, the power of public opinion in hostage situations was first harnessed 
by the Mitterrand government during the Lebanese for its own purposes in retrieving 
them home. In May 1988, he personally greeted three hostages whom had been in 
captivity for three years in Lebanon at Villacoublay Air Base. These hostages, two 
diplomats and a journalist, were featured on the nightly news every day of their captivity, 
which had the effect of creating huge interest in their condition at home. 
In response to the public’s expectations of the role of the government in a hostage 
crisis, procedures have developed for resolving hostage situations. It is first determined 
whether the abducted were taken for strictly financial or political reasons, of which clear 
guidelines have been created. If the nabbing is determined to be criminal/economic in 
nature it is managed by the French National Police; however, if the kidnapping is 
primarily political it is managed by a small group that sometime consists of the head of 
intelligence, the presidential chief of staff, and the defense minister. All the while the 
president is continually informed and requires approves of any deal. 
Despite, France’s reputation of quickly capitulating to ransom demands this is not 
the case, and; although the French will negotiate for hostages they do not always pay. 
Sometimes ransom demands are too expensive, or demands cost too much 
strategically. The process that has developed over the past thirty years has become 
highly politicized. A hostage’s safe return home is expected and is greeted with fanfare 
and positive coverage for a president. However, the murder of a hostage will be seen as 




The United States longstanding no-concessions policy developed during the Nixon 
administration after the kidnappings of two American diplomats and one Belgian at the 
American embassy in Khartoum in March, 1972.343 Members of the Black September 
organization demanded Palestinian prisoners be released in Israel, RAF members freed 
in Germany, and Sirhan Sirhan, Robert Kennedy’s assassin, released as well. It was 
politically impossible for Nixon to pardon the man who murdered a political rival who 
was also the brother of John F Kennedy, a man whom many considered martyred after 
his tragic death. Soon after President Nixon’s refusal to negotiate with the hostage-
takers became public all three officials were shot in the basement of the Khartoum 
embassy. Thereafter no-concessions became the general guiding principle of situations 
with American hostages held abroad.344 
Despite this seemingly stubborn policy there were many caveats that made no-
concessions less austere than on its face. Firstly, no-concessions only directly related to 
demands made from ‘terrorists’ to the United States government. Secondly, kidnappings 
deemed criminal in nature within the US are under the authority of the FBI and ransoms 
are often paid in these situations. In fact, the FBI used ransom monies paid to 
kidnappers to track the perpetrators so often that today this crime is virtually non-
existent in the United States. Thirdly, families of private citizens kidnapped abroad were 
not prohibited from paying ransoms for the release of their loved ones or their company 
as many such individuals are corporate executives.345Fourthly, as airline hijackings 
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occurred, the primary goal of the government was the safety of the passengers’ lives.346 
Fifthly, prisoners of war were never considered as having the same status as those 
kidnapped.347 
After a swell of public outrage by families of kidnaped Americans by ISIS, 
President Barak Obama ordered a review of American ransom policy in the fall of 2014. 
All federal agencies connected to hostage policy were represented in a number of 
meetings that included perticipants from the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, 
Department of Defense, FBI, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Justice Department, Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, State Department, and Treasury Department. What 
developed from those meetings is a new coordinated manner of resolving hostage 
cases still involving the same departments and agencies now under the leadership of 
the FBI as it has jurisdiction in kidnappings.  
 
5.4 Conclusion and Final Remarks 
 There is a longstanding debate about the effectiveness of states not paying 
ransoms to kidnappers to deter future kidnappings. Proponents of no-concessions 
suggest that their position projects a principled resolve that is not intimidated by 
violence that deter future kidnappings because kidnappers do not expect to be paid for 
their effort. Opponents of no-concession policies counter that kidnappings by armed 
groups are not deterred by states’ unwillingness to pay ransoms and that refusals only 
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make freeing hostages more difficult. Despite some anecdotal evidence by kidnappers 
themselves and the occasional study to suggest the contrary, there is no strong 
evidence to suggest that kidnappers target based on nationality. Accordingly, it is 
unlikely refusals to pay actually deter kidnappings of valuable targets. However, there is 
merit that no-concessions policies do protect a country’s internal rule of law and ensure 
long-term good governance by adhering to principles that do not make political 
concessions.    
In response to kidnappings by armed groups, a variety of policies by 
governments have been tried over the past fifty years. In the three cases explored 
above, domestic politics and a response to a particular kidnapping incident led to the 
adoption of a wider practice of responding to kidnappers’ ransom demands. When this 
topic is in the national debate, interest groups and the media can sometimes have an 
outsized influence on tipping the hand of government policy makers, such as in France 
with the support committees or in the US with the family of James Foley. What little 
research exists indicates that the most effective method to end kidnappings is 
destroying the organization, as for example occurred in the wake of heightened piracy 
off the Horn of Africa over the last decade. Three multinational coalitions patrolled an 
enormous area from the coast of Somalia to the Strait of Hormoz and the Red Sea.     
 Does the tactic of kidnap for ransom affect the organizational behavior of armed 
groups? This work’s thesis is: Kidnappings grows the infrastructure demands required 
to house victims, increases financial resources from ransom payments, and furthers 
clandestineness by members of the group. While this thesis is a logical conclusion to 




explored in chapter four. The FARC and the Taliban are two recent examples of groups 
that regularly use KfR as a terror tactic, but in the wider scope of the groups’ activities it 
constituted a small proportion of those groups’ overall tactics. What was and is most 
important to the FARC and to the Taliban’s financial assets are their participation in the 
narcotics trade. With the large financial resources acquired from the drug trade both 
groups bought influence with locals, expanded their materiel capabilities, attracted new 
recruits, and underwent alterations but not thorough changes to their ideology. 
 Some key points discussed in this work are that: Violent crime often correlates 
with high rates of kidnap for ransom across the globe. Economic inequality, weak rule of 
law, and unstable governance are also statistically significant markers for areas with a 
notorious kidnapping industry. Despite its commonness there is little that can be said 
about how most abductions occur, and so there is no ‘typical’ kidnapping incidence. An 
armed group’s ideology is a major factor that helps them focus their resources and 
energy on a set of targets that are enemies. Based on that criteria, an organization can 
begin to make informed decisions regarding individual targets and what tactics to use in 
order to neutralize it, e.g. assassination, KfR, bombing, mass shooting. High profile 
individuals who are at risk use a combination of protective technology and techniques 
that may include a security team to defend themselves and frustrate their assailants. 
However, besides members of the military ordinary people have precious few methods 
to guard themselves from attack. 
 The FARC and the Taliban arose during tumultuous times during their country’s 
history. Both organizations share a nationalistic orientation and spread a message of 




entered the drug trade, albeit for different reasons, and was able to profit and expand 
their operations to a formidable status that challenged their respective governments’ 
authority. In response to setbacks each group faced they tried to make up for lost 
revenue while continuing to further their mission by adopting a kidnap for ransom tactic. 
However, this only minorly supplemented the financial resources the drug trade 
provided. Ultimately, for the FARC and the Taliban KfR had a larger political payout 
than a financial one as a result of using their hostages as bargaining chips—as one 
might expect from a tactic of terrorism. 
 Internationally, policies of no-concessions to ransom demands from armed 
groups has had a scattered acceptance by states over about the past 50 years. No one 
approach has dominated in popularity or acceptance and many times governments 
have taken an ad hoc approach to the way they respond to these situations. Since the 
early part of the last decade the United Kingdom and the United States have sought to 
build a consensus around a refusal to meet ransom demands, as the world’s two most 
outspoken critics of KfR payments. Yet, there efforts did little to form a lasting 
agreement on the practice, besides rhetorical victories, and the movement to forge a 
worldwide policy has deteriorated.  
 This work highlights the ability to which it is possible to understand how an armed 
group changes over time. It is difficult but not impossible to construct a causal chain of 
events when the most relevant data is examined. Narrative history and journalism are 
valuable tools in this search. Although the community of social scientists understand 
that those who commit acts of terror are rational actors like anyone else, policy makers 




does not have political motives at their core of the perpetrator’s motives. For the sake of 
protecting life against violence it is vital that CT authorities and policy makers 
understand the innerworkings of illegal dark networks to thwart their attacks on civilians, 
especially. Furthermore, it is in the best interest of all parties involved—hostages, their 
governments, private security contractors, and even hostage-takers—that governments 
have a clear, cohesive ransom policy articulated. Policy makers need to ask themselves 
what are their priorities with their ransom policy and are those priorities actually met by 
it. What little research that is available indicates at the least that no-concessions policies 
do not deter kidnappings to the extent their proponents suggest they do. Nevertheless, 
scientific research cannot answer what a society’s highest values are: only the people in 
a society and their leaders can answer this question.  
 Future research on kidnap for ransom should explore ways that it can be 
reported to a responsible institution when local authorities cannot be trusted by their 
populace. Possible future research questions are: Has globalization integrated armed 
groups into the world economy? Has COVID-19 affected trends in KfR or human 
trafficking since 2020? A significant part of the problem with respect to combating this 
problem is the lack of transparency about which groups kidnap. In the majority of cases 
this information is not known of course some notorious organizations are well famous. A 
centralized database that contains basic information about a kidnapping case would go 
a long way in identifying trends with the larger goal of protecting lives from harm and 
denying insurgencies and armed groups funds to operate. This goal is one that many 
diverse peoples can rally around. Particularly since the migrant crisis of 2015, al Qaeda 




is the time to address this matter of safety that is affecting the flow of migrants from 
many nations who are fleeing turmoil and hardship in their homes.  
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